39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 26 Side A

04/17/2017 09:23:23

2_BIRD_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/13/17 11:11 AM

TURNING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INTO
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
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Compliance is a core concern for corporate governance. Firms devote
tremendous amounts of money, personnel, and attention to ensure
compliance with regulatory mandates, and yet compliance failures
proliferate. This is because the current static and binary view of
compliance hinders both efficient compliance by firms and effective
regulation by government. Understanding the reality that compliance is
both dynamic and driven by efficiency empowers firms to evolve past mere
conformance and into wealth maximizing innovation. This Article
develops an efficient investment-risk (EIR) model of compliance that
captures the tradeoffs between cost and risk, parses the oft-commingled
concepts of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, and enables firms
to obtain a competitive advantage through compliance. We also turn our
attention to regulators and highlight how the EIR model can enhance
regulatory design, foster regulator-firm cooperation, and advance the
mutual goals of business and society.
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1. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 3, 137 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2014).
2. See W. Mark Crain & Nicole V. Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S.
Economy, Manufacturing and Small Business, NAT’L ASS’N. OF MFRS. 1 (2014)
http://www.nam.org/Data-and-Reports/Cost-of-Federal-Regulations/Federal-RegulationFull-Study.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EF8Y-YMZ3] (reporting the quantified costs of
regulatory compliance on firms).
3. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRAFT 2015
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 8 (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2015_cb/draft_2015_cost_benef
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This is a critical time for the study of compliance. Corporate and
regulatory compliance, which consists of the internal processes that firms
use to ensure that their employees do not violate applicable laws and
regulations,1 has become big business. The stakes for firms are high. Costs
associated with compliance are as high as $10,000 per employee and
impose multi-billion dollar expenditures.2
Regulation of business
3
continues to grow unabated, particularly in heavily regulated industries,
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such as health care and financial services.4 Compliance staffing has rapidly
increased, and firms are allocating extensive resources towards managing
the compliance function.5 The only thing more costly than compliance is
non-compliance, with a survey of firms revealing that the cost of noncompliance is more than double the price of following the rules.6 It is little
wonder why fifty-eight percent of compliance officers wake up in the
middle of the night worrying about work.7
With so much at stake, and with such great resources allocated, why
do so many firms still fail to comply with legal rules? The usual suspects—
bad actors, an unethical business culture, and compromised regulators—are
surely present. However, failures to comply still occur in environments
where bad actors are few, the culture is conducive, and regulators are not
particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture. Even though a new industry
in corporate compliance has sprung up,8 it is unclear whether simply
spending more money on compliance necessarily produces a more
compliant enterprise.9 While company investments in compliance often
lead to perceptible benefits,10 many firms are struggling with the rapidly
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it_report.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LWU7-C8CX] [hereinafter OMB REPORT] (disclosing that
federal administrative agencies published 36,457 rules between fiscal years 2005 and 2014).
4. See State of Compliance Survey 2015, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 5 (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/state-of-compliance-survey/assets/pwc-2015state-of-compliance-survey-final.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/EFR6-2LRX] (noting the particular
compliance-related challenges faced by companies that enter the health care or financial
services market).
5. See Rich Steeves, JPMorgan to Double Compliance Budget in 2014, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/12/12/jpmorgan-to-doublecompliance-budget-in-2014 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UR9H-835Z] (reporting on JPMorgan’s $2
billion budget for compliance staffing and training in response to investigations and
enforcement actions).
6. The True Cost of Compliance, PONEMON INST., LLC 2 (Jan. 2011),
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report_copy.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/B3WV-RN4A].
7. Michael O’Brien, Stress and the Compliance Officer, HUM. RES. EXEC. ONLINE 1
(Feb.
6,
2012),
http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=533344814
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/Q69E-DXRP].
See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of
Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71,
129 n.251 (2014) (noting that a “running theme” of interviews of compliance specialists was
that the “[Chief Compliance Officer] is a tough and lonely job.”).
8. See, e.g., Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: A Dream
Career?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014) (“In a U.S. economy struggling to create jobs, at least
one field is booming: compliance.”).
9. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the PrincipalAgent Model, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005) (“[L]ittle empirical evidence exists
regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring organizational
misconduct . . . .”).
10. See Ken Tysiac, SOX Compliance Costs Rise For Many Companies, Report Finds,
J. ACCOUNTANCY (May 2013), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2013/
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rising costs of compliance in the face of ever more complex, far-ranging,
and sometimes ambiguous regulatory mandates.11
The consequences are significant. If firms perceive their obligations
as insurmountable, they may turn way from good faith efforts to comply
and concentrate on spending resources to defy or evade regulation.12 If
managers become cynical about compliance, a culture of disrespect against
compliance may develop, which is ultimately harmful to the firm.13 That
attitude, in turn, foments unethical behavior that is destructive to society at
large through unethical business practices that destabilize the economy. A
climate of doubt and distrust between the regulator and the firm imposes
losses on both parties and society at large. With examples of noncompliance firmly in the public limelight,14 citizens openly question both
the legitimacy of regulators and corporate actors to maintain the public
trust.15 Amidst these challenges, the concrete has yet to harden on how to
optimally produce public-private engagement that meets regulatory goals,
curtails firm-borne compliance costs, and minimizes negative externalities
on society.
Compliance scholars and professionals tend to focus on the
organization as the relevant locus of action and on procedural and
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may/20137990.html [https://perma.cc/SRQ3-42YH] (noting different ways a focus on
compliance generates positive results for companies).
11. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the
2013 National Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515226#P22_4354
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7V7Z-Z9S8] (noting the “overwhelming volume and pace of new and
anticipated regulations” in the securities industry and the difficulty of firms in complying
with them).
12. See Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply: That
Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 112–13 (Christine Parker
& Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011) (describing how regulated firms are able to
“reshape the meaning of compliance” through political contestation).
13. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 12 (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651101 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/72KF-N2XW].
14. See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys 6–7 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9W2M-Y6MP]
(discussing how the Department of Justice’s new policies on individual corporate
wrongdoing reflect a bolstered regulatory focus on the substantive elements of a company’s
compliance program).
15. See Christopher M. Matthews, Survey Finds Unethical Business Practices on the
Rise,
WALL.
S T.
J.
(May
23,
2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2012/05/23/survey-finds-unethical-business-practices-on-the-rise
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/MG4G-P9NX] (explaining a study evidencing the willingness of many
corporate executives to partake in unethical business practices).
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16. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 171–93 (discussing organizational compliance
through the internal enforcement of institutional policies and programs).
17. See Paul J. Heald, Economics As One of the Humanities: An Ecumenical Response
to Weisberg, West, and White, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 293, 309 (1995) (“[W]e should
remember that the choice between rights and efficiency does not inevitably make the
efficiency norm look inhumane.”).
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institutional rules as the means of ensuring conformity.16 An overly
simplistic view of compliance, however, does a disservice to regulators and
firms alike.
Compliance needs to be understood and addressed
pragmatically as it exists and with the powerful potential it truly holds.
Accordingly, this Article develops an efficient investment-risk (EIR) model
of corporate compliance that illuminates the opportunities in compliancebased regulation. Drawing on concepts of law and economics, the EIR
model shows how firms decide whether—and to what extent—to comply
along a compliance “frontier” in order to optimize the relative benefits of
compliance to the firm relative to cost, thereby minimizing avoidable costs
resulting from inefficient deployment of firm resources. By highlighting
the consequences for a firm to comply in any given instance, our model
increases the effectiveness of business regulation that advances the public
good.17
The EIR model also equips regulators with a dynamic
understanding of how compliance functions respond to different kinds of
regulatory mandates. Through our model, we identify and define three
distinct kinds of regulatory mandates—Direct Regulation, Collaborative
Regulation, and Market Contingent Regulation—and show how regulators
can strategically use different combinations of regulatory approaches to
compel more firm-efficient compliance. Applying the EIR model to
corporate compliance will increase the overall effectiveness of business
regulation. Regulators and lawmakers will be better able to calibrate
regulatory enforcement measures to public policy goals. Firms will more
clearly see the strategic benefits of complying with law through a more
risk-aware view of their compliance functions.
This Article proceeds as follows.
Part I examines corporate
compliance as a set of non-binary, dynamic, and bounded choices by firms
in response to regulatory mandates. Instead of static and dichotomous
decisions of whether to comply or not, compliance requires that firms
constantly assess the degree to which they want to comply, all the while
facing factual ambiguity or uncertainty. Parts II and III develop the EIR
model in two stages. In Part II, we demonstrate how compliance can be
mapped along a continuum of compliance decisions that takes into account
the costs associated with a firm’s investments in compliance (e.g.,
additional personnel or infrastructure) relative to the risks associated with
the firm’s decision to comply (i.e., the probability of incurring legal
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sanctions for non-compliance multiplied by the penalties or damages from
enforcement). Using these concepts, Part III presents the EIR model to
conceptualize the implications of under-compliance or over-compliance by
firms. Finally, Parts IV and V apply the insights of the EIR model to
address fundamental questions regarding business regulation. In Part IV,
we show how different kinds of regulatory mandates influence the dynamic
relationship between regulators and regulated firms in respect of a firm’s
decision to comply. Part V analyzes the ways in which firms can reduce
compliance risk without investing in additional compliance resources. This
is achieved through what we describe as “risk-cost transformation,” and we
explore how corporations, in particular, can improve individual employee
decision-making and firm-wide internal governance to achieve this
potential “win-win” scenario.
I.

COMPLIANCE AS A NON-BINARY, DYNAMIC, AND BOUNDED
CHOICE

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

18. Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 549 (2005).
19. Id.
20. Id. See also Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 617,
637–39 (2005) (describing binary disclosure under the Clean Air Act).
21. See Burk, supra note 18, at 549 (“Rules offer clear imperatives for behavior, but
this means that they tend to be essentially binary; that is, one is either in compliance or one
is not. This in turn means that in their pure form, rules leave little room for nuance or
factual shading. Due to their inflexibility, they may lead to costly outcomes if they fit a
given situation poorly.”).
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Compliance, both as a legal requirement and a business practice, is
woefully misunderstood. First, compliance is too often misunderstood as
conformance with binary rules, whereby a firm is either in compliance or
out of compliance with the requirement. Conceiving of compliance as a
binary rule is not without advantages. Binary rules offer clear imperatives
for proper conduct.18 A firm is either in compliance with the rule or out of
compliance.19 Binary rules offer little in terms of nuance or context.20 As a
result, binary rules have the advantage of being clear and easy to interpret
from the regulated firm’s perspective.
Binary rules, however, can cause problems. Because such rules are
inflexible by nature, they may lead to unnecessarily costly or unjust
outcomes.21 Binary rules also resist contextual interpretation by courts and
are not easily adaptable to changing social, environmental, or marketplace
conditions. They also undermine the opportunity for consideration that
more flexible rules might produce. Instead of considering the underlying
purpose of the regulation, a binary rule encourages a manager to meet a
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given standard without further reflection.22 This is known as “regulatory
ritualism,” whereby actors accept means for meeting regulatory goals but
lose focus on achieving the purpose of those goals.23 Actors use this as a
means of “get[ting] by” in a regulatory society,24 but risk doing so at an
eventual cost to the firm.
Instead of binary conditions, firms can exist in various gradations of
compliant and non-compliant states. Firms can be in minor noncompliance or severe non-compliance depending on the enterprise’s
deviation from a given regulatory rule or standard.25 Firms can also be
fully compliant without any deviation. In addition, compliance with a
given regulation may be different for each firm according to their unique
internal and external combination of resources. A firm’s combination of
industry, market positioning, human resources, capital investments, and
relationship with regulators can determine whether and to what extent a
firm is non-compliant and what conditions are necessary to satisfy the
regulatory requirement.26
Second, compliance is all too often not treated as a dynamic system.
Compliance is a system that is typified by constant change, activity, or
evolution.27 Compliance requirements, even for sweeping regulatory
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22. See Malloy, supra note 20, at 662 (applying a binary rule may prevent thoughtful
consideration of the basis underlying the rule in the first place).
23. Carol A. Heimer & J. Lynn Gazley, Performing Regulation: Transcending
Regulatory Ritualism in HIV Clinics, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 853, 856 (2012).
24. Id. (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND
THE NEW PYRAMID 330 (2007)).
25. See, e.g., Katie Bergstrom, Brian Dillion & Gray Plant Mooty, Quality of Care as a
Basis for False Claims Act Liability: Is the Proof Insurmountable?, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 147,
148 (2008) (“In fact, in most cases, a [health care] provider’s level of compliance with a
particular quality of care standard will fall somewhere on a continuum between full
compliance and no compliance at all.”).
26. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives:
Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 535–36 (2002) (conceptualizing how a firm’s
organization and internal processes affect its reaction to regulation).
27. Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Remarks Before the Investment Adviser Compliance Best Practices
Summit: Compliance Programs: Our Shared Mission 2 (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022805lar.htm [https://perma.cc/BY77-TH7S] (“One
of the most important lessons we have learned is that your compliance program cannot be
static. It can’t be ‘done,’ ‘on the shelf,’ or ‘fixed.’ An effective compliance program must
continue to evolve and, to do so, the program must be able to identify, meet, and incorporate
changes in your business and changes in your customers, to continue to identify conflicts of
interest, to be responsive to changes in the statutory and regulatory regime, and to
continually strive to find the best technology and the best people. It must be measured by its
results. Indeed, much of this conference is dedicated to providing practical advice on how
to ensure that your compliance program is actively preventing, detecting and correcting
securities laws violations. I have heard this concept of an activist compliance program
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mandates, are not consistent across different firms. Each company faces its
own regulatory mix from which arises the collective compliance
obligations of the enterprise. Small companies may be exempt from
obligations that larger firms must follow.28 Firms in different industries
may require specialized compliance capacity to respond to industryspecific regulatory mandates. One firm may have a more productive
history with a regulatory authority than another, leaving open the
possibility of it receiving the benefit of the doubt when non-compliance
occurs.29 A firm’s culture may require compliance processes to be
implemented in different ways. Employees motivated by rewards may be
more interested and engaged in compliance procedures through
gamification of compliance standards.30
States of compliance and non-compliance evolve over time. In
response to changing regulatory requirements, firms typically use resources
to improve their compliance practices.31 They train their employees to
better spot and proactively remedy compliance problems.32 They also hire
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referred to as having a ‘living, breathing’ compliance program.”).
28. See OMB REPORT, supra note 3, at 41–42 (noting that many statutes and
regulations explicitly attempt to reduce regulatory burdens on small businesses by limiting
costs and providing exemptions and slower phase-in periods).
29. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Reforming Pharmaceutical Industry-Physician
Financial Relationships: Lessons from the United States, France, and Japan, 39 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 662, 665 (2011) (noting passage of guidelines stating that firms that follow an
industry code are considered to “demonstrate[] good faith efforts” toward compliance).
30. See, e.g., Ryan J. Baxter et al., Applying Basic Gamification Techniques to IT
Compliance Training: Evidence from the Lab and Field, 30 J. INFO. SYS. 119, 121 (2016)
(discussing how gamification can be used as a business tool to engage people in non-game
situations through a similar type of rewards system); Raymund J. Lin et al., Designing a
Web-based Behavior Motivation Tool for Healthcare Compliance, 23 HUM. FACTORS &
ERGONOMICS IN MANU. & SVC. INDUS. 58, 61–63 (2013) (designing a program where
“desired user behaviors can be motivated through proper rewards on actions”).
31. It is theoretically possible, though unlikely, that firms will devolve their
compliance framework. One common response to rising compliance costs is outsourcing
arrangements with third-party service providers. See The Evolving Role of Compliance,
SEC.
INDUS.
&
FIN.
MARKETS
ASS’N
16–17
(Mar.
2013),
www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589942363 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2CNGEQAP] [hereinafter “SIFMA Compliance White Paper”] (outsourcing may increase
efficiencies and reduce costs of compliance).
32. See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 979–81 (2012)
(“Explicit compliance communications are not enough. Compliance officers must reach
across functional boundaries to executive management and the human resources group and,
if necessary, educate them about the principles of employee engagement and the value of
consistent explicit and behavioral messaging that activates the employees’ values and brings
out their best natures. Compliance officers must secure the active cooperation of these
groups not only in transmitting the right words, but also in modeling ethical behavior,
trustworthiness, fairness, and quality interpersonal treatment of employees.”).
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33. See generally James Rathz, Compliance as the Competitive Differentiator, 12 DUQ.
BUS. L.J. 13 (2009) (describing potential competitive advantage for compliance in a
financial services context).
34. See Elizabeth Horrigan Rathz, Organic Compliance . . . Doing More With Less, 12
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (“For regulated entities, timely and perceptive identification of
regulatory and reputational risk contributes to improved productivity and a greater return on
capital investment over the long run.”).
35. Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN L. REV. 713, 716–18 (1997).
36. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 538 (“[R]egulatory investments join in the
competition and are subject, to varying degrees, to evaluation on the basis of such factors as
the return on investment, the fit with corporate strategic goals, and the extent of the
sponsoring sub-unit’s influence within the firm.”).
37. See Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 643, 658–59 (2012) (focusing on regulator-bounded rationality).
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personnel to administer compliance processes and determine necessary
steps to comply with regulation. This results in some firms practicing
compliance better than others, creating the possibility that effective
compliance can be a source of competitive advantage over rivals.33 Some
firms will simply do compliance more efficiently and more effectively than
others. In addition, investments in capital assets will provide the
information systems and control processes to monitor firm activity,
maintain records, and deliver necessary data to regulators and auditors.34
These twin paths of human and capital investment help sustain compliant
behavior when the firm is under stress and generate compliance norms that
are self-sustaining. Firms generally have an overall incentive to comply
with regulations in the short- and long-term.35
In addition, compliance, somewhat counterintuitively, becomes more
difficult the more completely a firm seeks to achieve it. Firms will
generally seek compliance with the regulations that are least costly to
follow or have the greatest return on their investment.36 Easily obtained
gains, however, are eventually consumed as firms need more complicated
and extensive investments to achieve more complete states of compliance.
A firm’s first compliance initiative is substantively different in form and
function than its tenth initiative or its hundredth. Compliance personnel
must be agile enough to recognize when processes work and when
innovations are necessary even when the regulatory waters are quiet. The
more firms move toward the ideal of perfection, the more difficult the
improvements get.
Third, and perhaps most important, compliance is bounded by human
limitations.37 Such bounded knowledge arises even before a given rule
becomes enforceable. For example, a legislative authority may design a
rule that is unnecessarily ambiguous or complex. Such suboptimal drafting
may be the result of inattention to the consequences of such regulation, lack
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of sufficient time and resources by staffers to fully attend to emerging
language, or deliberate vagueness created in order to ensure amenability by
antagonistic political interests.38 From the moment the rule is enacted, it is
already imbedded with imperfections that make complete compliance
unknowable.
These human limitations may be amplified by the enforcing regulator.
Regulators, though in possession of significant expertise, are tasked with
enforcing a rule that is already unclear. Regulators are thus often forced to
interpret and apply uncertain language, increasing the potential further for
ambiguity and lack of understanding of what precisely the rule demands.39
Regulators or their administrators may also have political assumptions or
aspirations that color their perception about how “hard” or “softly” a rule
will be interpreted.40 Such political factors can change when a new
administration takes control, further obfuscating the ability to define a
knowable standard for a given rule. These interpretive limitations, through
legislative drafter to rulemaking administrator to regulatory enforcer, can
result in a frustrating metaphorical game of telephone, where the original
purpose of the drafter travels through multiple actors who either willfully
or inadvertently muddy the intent of the lawmakers.41
Consequently, when the message of compliance with the rule finally
reaches the regulated, it faces a separate set of distortive lenses as the rule
is processed and interpreted by the firm. Knowledge frictions in
acquisition or dissemination may prevent employees from optimally
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38. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1282 (1983) (“The clash of interest groups, the
greater ease of sensing the existence of problems than of framing solutions, the wish to
retain flexibility, the desire to please as wide a constituency as possible, the benefits of
calculated ambiguity, or the serendipity of unintended ambiguity—all of these have
produced a growing number of statutes embodying vague standards or none at all.”);
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schachter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594–95 (2002) (“Staffers regularly cited
two clarifying-undermining dynamics: the lack of sufficient time and the phenomenon of
deliberate ambiguity.”).
39. See Horowitz, supra note 38, at 1282–83 (“If [the statute’s] meaning or their reach
is unclear, someone will have to interpret them. In the first instance, that someone will
often be the administrative agency charged with implementing the law. Sometimes the
agency has taken a bold view of its authority, which has then been ratified by the courts, and
sometimes the agency has been found to be too timid in fulfilling its mandate.”).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the
Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 975 (2001)
(summarizing an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study providing evidence that
“many violations result from sincere disagreements or differing interpretations of what EPA
regulations mean”).
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understanding or complying with rules.42
Aspirations to achieve
compliance may be insufficient or misdirected.43 Counsel assigned to
interpret and disseminate the rule can impose their own perspective based
upon practice background and specialized training. Individual managers,
even with guidance, may not have the knowledge capacity to navigate
complex or unclear rules and thus are left to use shortcut heuristics to
divine a mandate. Even if managers are fully guided, agency problems can
intervene whereby managers bypass responsibility in order to protect or
further their own careers.44
If, even through all of these interpretive lenses, a standard of
compliance can be properly understood, exogenous forces can revive
ambiguity. Changes in political power can threaten an established
regulatory agenda.45 Economic shocks can trigger unexpected changes in
regulation that render prior compliance practices out-of-date.46 Unexcused
compliance can unexpectedly result from natural disasters.47 Catastrophes
can trigger legislative overreaction from an angry public, resulting in hasty
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42. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 107 (2002) (“This process of social
construction [of managerial motives] is both personal to each agent and heavily influenced
by his or her local peers at the firm. And there is no guarantee that this will produce an
accurate construction of management’s motives.”). In the employment context, for
example, many employees misunderstand their legal rights and obligations under
employment-at-will laws, erroneously believing they have legal rights akin to just cause.
See Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will
in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 310–11, 311 n.16 (2002) (commenting on the
misperceptions surrounding employment-at-will contracts).
43. See John T. Nicolaou, Whistle While You Work: How the False Claims Act
Amendments Protect Internal Whistleblowers, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 531, 540 (2011)
(noting in the False Claims Act context that an overly broad interpretation of protected
activity by well-meaning employers can cause employees to run afoul of the rules).
44. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 558–60 (noting the role of specialization within firms
in respect of profit maximization).
45. See, e.g., House Republicans Take Aim at Dodd-Frank in Budget Plan, REUTERS
(Mar. 17, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/financial-regulationhousebudget-idUSL2N0WJ0ZC20150317
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UDJ5-Q6AX](describing
ongoing efforts in the House of Representatives to weaken and repeal the Dodd-Frank Act).
46. See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 55, 92–100 (2011)
(describing the implementation of new disclosure and corporate governance requirements
under the Dodd-Frank Act to regulate risk management practices).
47. See Natural Events and Disasters, U.S. ENV. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agriculture-natural-events-and-disasters (last visited Feb. 2,
2016) [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/RB7X-8K2Z] (“Even though natural events and disasters can be
devastating to agricultural production, it does not excuse noncompliance with state and
federal environmental laws.”).
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and ill-conceived standards.48 Even without a prior trigger, society can
simply demand greater compliance than a firm expects, punishing a
company even when it finds itself fully compliant with established rules.49
To cite a historically prominent example, when a jury found Ford Motor
Company criminally liable for negligent manufacture of an automobile, it
did so even though it found that Ford had complied with federal
government automobile safety standards at the time of manufacture.50 In
this instance, Ford was in compliance with law, until a jury decided that it
was not.
Skilled compliance professionals—whether lawyers or non-legal
compliance professionals—can bring significant protection, as well as
value,51 to the enterprise, and a robust compliance program is de rigueur for
a corporation or any other firm of any substantial size.52 However, any
attempt to make compliance work must be cognizant of its limitations.
Corporate compliance is an imperfect science, and those tasked with
compliance can never achieve a perfect state.53 The forces preventing
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48. Cf. Kyle Welch, The Patriot Act and Crisis Legislation: The Unintended
Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 481 (2015); Gregory L. Ryan,
Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting: Why the Inclusion of Perjury as an Aggravated Felony
Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 989, 991 n.3 (1997) (noting
overreaction by Congress in response to terrorist acts).
49. See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and
Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 307, 308 (2004) (defining social license “as the demands on and expectations for a
business enterprise that emerge from neighborhoods, environmental groups, community
members, and other elements of the surrounding civil society.”).
50. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771 (1981). See also
Matthew T. Lee, The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety Regulations,
1893-1978, 27 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 390, 390–91 (1998) (explaining how the NHTSA
[(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration)] engineer group found the Ford Pinto
“unsafe” even though its fire threshold met the federal minimum standard); R. Eric
Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of Corporate Moral Development, 10
J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 277 (1991) (describing how Ford’s attorney’s argument was that “the
Pinto met all federal, state, and local government standards concerning auto fuel systems.”).
The jury in this case nonetheless awarded the plaintiffs $125 million in punitive damages.
Paul J. Zwier, Due Process and Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 407, 427–28 (1991).
51. See generally Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate
Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203 (2016) (describing how corporate
counsel can improve corporate governance and promote a culture of integrity).
52. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 488 (2003) (noting the rapid growth in ethics and
compliance consulting following the Enron scandal and the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act).
53. Spence, supra note 41, at 975 (summarizing an EPA study providing persuasive
evidence that “perfect compliance is almost impossible to achieve even for sophisticated and
conscientious firms”); Langevoort, supra note 42, at 79 (“Within the securities business and
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“perfect” compliance are as fundamental as those governing human nature.
While egregious conduct can certainly be curbed through robust
enforcement and clear mandates, mistakes, mishaps, and misinterpretations
are inevitable.54 Social, political, and economic forces can change the
expectations of compliance without warning.55 No matter how diligent
compliance professionals are, the practice of compliance is embedded with
imperfections. Conflict with the regulatory environment for most firms of
significant size is all but inevitable.
II.

COMPLIANCE IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF RISK-INTELLIGENCE

If a perfect state of compliance is unachievable, and compliance is
inundated with constant change, then both regulator and firm must accept
those conditions in order to make compliance work. Fortunately, there is
more to compliance than bounded limitations and dynamically changing
standards.
Making compliance work requires viewing compliance
decisions through the lens of risk. Risk is defined as “the potential for loss
caused by an event (or series of events) that can adversely affect the
achievement of a company’s objectives.”56 The understanding of risk has
matured from reducing the probability of hazards to treating risk in a
systematic way.57 The management of risk is now a proactive decision that
firms make in anticipation of key decisions or problems that arise. The
decision to comply with rules, even under a compulsive regime, thus
remains a considered choice. That choice can trigger sanctions if the
improper choice is made,58 but is done so with a firm being aware as much
as it can be of the consequences of that decision.
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elsewhere, there is no reasonable expectation of, or even desire for, perfect compliance with
law.”).
54. Spence, supra note 41, at 975.
55. See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J.
CORP. L. 325, 331 (2013) (attributing the rise in enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to regulatory emphasis on rule of law in foreign markets, greater international
cooperation with anti-corruption enforcement, and enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Dodd-Frank Act).
56. The
Risk
Intelligent
Enterprise,
5
(2013),
DELOITTE
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-RiskCompliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligent-erm-doneright.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/7GJM-6Z5D]. On
constructing this definition, the document states that “[m]any definitions exist, with varying
degrees of detail and precision. We have analyzed and assimilated several, combined them
with our own perspective, and distilled the result” to the definition quoted in the text. Id.
57. KIT SADGROVE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 1–2
(2015).
58. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 671 (2006).
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There are different considerations that impact risk-intelligent decisionmaking, but most coalesce under two broad considerations. The first is the
risk of non-compliance or compliance risk.59
Firms calculate the
consequences of their actions if a firm is not in compliance with a rule.
Non-compliance, as mentioned, is not simply one of two possible choices,
but one of a range of states that a firm can engage. Firms can pervasively
minimize their compliance risk through thorough training of employees,
implementation of complex control systems, hiring dedicated staff, and
introducing substantial rewards and penalties that encourage compliant
decision-making.60 Other firms may not expend resources at all, leaving
the compliance risk high, or implement measures that produce substantial,
though not complete, reductions in compliance risk.
In addition to risk, firms also account for the resources allocated to
investments in compliance. While the firm that engages in a pervasive
compliance program may reduce their risk of non-compliance, they may do
so at a cost that becomes unsustainable for maintaining a competitive
market position. Fundamentally, firms “purchase” a given amount of
compliance in order to reduce a given amount of risk to the enterprise.61
When measurements of compliance reveal no results, negative results, or
results that are not proportionate to the cost invested, the purchase decision
will change.62

59. Compliance risk is defined as:

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

Michael D. Kelsey & Michael Matossian, Compliance Risk: Ensuring the Risk Taken is the
Risk
Intended,
ABA
COMPLIANCE
6
(May-June
2004)
BANK
http://www.aba.com/Compliance/Documents/4d653dd0ea5d45bcba1b4ebfa0189003CompR
isk.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/K7SZ-SCQR]. See also Compliance and the Compliance
Function in Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION
7 (Apr. 2005) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/QX86-MRAQ]
(defining compliance risk as “the threat posed to an organization’s financial, organizational,
or reputational standing resulting from violations of laws or regulations, self-regulatory
industry standards, codes of conduct, or organizational standards”).
60. For more discussion, see infra Part V.B.
61. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1359 (1999).
62. Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and Overcoming Legal
Uncertainty in Business Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 247, 311 (2014).
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The adverse consequences that can arise from systemic, unforeseen, or isolated
violations of applicable laws and regulations, internal standards and policies,
and expectations of key stakeholders[,] . . . which can result in financial losses,
reputation damage, regulatory sanctions, and, in severe cases, loss of franchise
or rejected mergers and acquisitions.
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The combination of investments in compliance protocols and the risk
of non-compliance can be visualized in the following figure:

FIGURE 1. INTERSECTIONS OF COMPLIANCE RISK AND COST
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The horizontal x-axis is the risk adjusted “price” or “cost” of noncompliance, which represents the total risk to which the firm is currently
exposed. This axis is intended to incorporate whatever costs facing the
enterprise that may arise from non-compliance, including formal penalties,
reputational impacts on customers, organizational morale costs, relations
with regulators, and perceptions of society. These costs are risk-adjusted in
order to account for their likelihood of actually arising. The lower the
firm’s risk-adjusted cost of compliance, the farther to the left the firm
appears on the x-axis. The vertical y-axis is the quantity of resources a
firm invests in human and capital compliance. Like the x-axis, this can
include virtually any protocol that the firm deems necessary to achieve a
sufficient compliance program. This can include training employees,
hiring compliance professionals, monitoring requirements, and investing in
information technology. The higher the firm’s position on the y-axis, the
more investments in compliance the firm has made.
Finally, the combination of the firm’s compliance investments and the
risk in its environment produce a compliance position for the enterprise.
This compliance position highlights a given commitment to investing in
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compliance resources and the resultant non-compliance risks that exist as a
result of that investment. Crucially, this depiction of the compliance
function is scalable along multiple dimensions: it can be applied to analyze
the decision-making of a single employee tasked with conforming to a
single regulation, or an entire firm evaluating its compliance practices in
light of the sum of regulatory mandates to which it is subject.
Figure 1 offers three examples. Assume that at point “a,” a firm
invests $1 in compliance protocols, as reflected on the y-axis. As a result
of these investments, the firm sustains a risk exposure of $5. The total cost
of compliance, as expressed by intersection of the axes, is $6. At point “b,”
a firm increases its investments to $2. As one would expect when a firm
allocates more resources to compliance, the firm’s risk-adjusted cost of
non-compliance changes in response. In the example provided, at point
“b”, the firm’s $2 investment in compliance results in its risk exposure
decreasing to $3. Total cost of compliance at point “b” is $5. Point “c” is
the inverse of “b,” as the firm invests $3 and has $2 of risk exposure. At
point “d,” the firm has substantially increased its investments to $5,
perhaps representing an aggressive initiative to avoid legal and societal
exposure from violated rules. This $5 investment at point “d” generates a
risk exposure of only $1 for the enterprise, with a total cost of $6. Each
point has its own combination of investment input and output of a given
risk level.
Figure 1 reveals meaningful information regarding the nature of
compliance. First, compliance is judged through both price and risk
criteria, which makes the necessary investments accountable to reductions
in risk exposure. Second, firms have the power to make choices about
those criteria independently or in conjunction with one another. Third,
regardless of how firms perceive the price of compliance and the risk of
non-compliance, a compliance decision forces these two factors to interact
with one another. Fourth, the interaction of price and risk places the firm
in a single position within the range of possible compliance positioning
choices. A firm’s compliance profile does not arise by chance but through
tacit or deliberate choices to weigh investments relative to risk.
Notably, not all of the choices in Figure 1 are created equal. Points
“d” and “a” are essentially the same from the firm’s perspective. The
primary difference between the choices is to whom the cost of compliance
is paid. At point “a,” most of the cost of compliance is paid in sanctions
and penalties. At point “d,” most of the cost of compliance arises from
investments in protocols by the firm. Points “b” and “c”, however,
represent a superior choice for the firm. The net cost of compliance is only
$5, lower than what it costs at “a” or “d.” This allows the firm, through
optimal allocation of resources, to receive a greater reduction in risk
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relative to its investments in compliance. It represents a risk-efficient
position, and one that firms should naturally seek out.
This difference in value more accurately represents how compliance
actually functions.
Firms are rarely indifferent about compliance.
Managers do not typically conclude that the same price will be paid no
matter what action the firm takes, whether it be payment in sanctions or
investments. The choice to either invest in compliance or pay the cost of
non-compliance implies imperfect substitutes. Firms can switch between
compliance and sanction, but the tradeoff is not identical. This means that
a firm can select a suboptimal compliance strategy and pay $6, or seek out
the superior positioning and pay $5.
Given the presence of imperfect substitutes and the nearly infinite
range of choices from which a firm can choose a compliance position, the
compliance options of a firm can be modeled as shown in the following
figure:

The compliance function in Figure 2 is a “flipped” version of the
production function.63 Value is represented on the x-axis and cost is
represented on the y-axis. The productivity frontier is represented by a
downward concave continuum of best practices that a firm can attain for a
given combination of cost-value activities. In this production function, a
firm can choose a high-cost, high-value production strategy or a low-cost,
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63. In microeconomics, a production function involves a tradeoff between two or more
inputs that produce a given output. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 311 (6th
ed. 1995).
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low-value alternative.64 Most firms would be somewhere “beneath” the
curve, choosing a given cost-value function while striving to make their
production processes more efficient, and thus toward the productivity
frontier.
In the compliance context, rather than trying to deliver the maximum
value-cost combination, firms seek to minimize their risk-cost profile
through compliance practices. In Figure 2, the range of input choices is
modeled by a curved line that highlights the set of points at which the
combination of investment and risk choices produces a series of outputs
(e.g., here, the total firm cost of compliance). The concavity of the curved
line shows the substitutability of compliance “goods” on the x and y axis
— i.e., the substitutability of compliance investments versus exposure to
non-compliance. The curved line represents a continuum of choices that
incorporate different investment-risk profiles—in other words, a
compliance frontier.65 A firm set at a point on the lower right end of the
compliance frontier chooses to invest few resources in compliance. Those
resources in labor and capital can be invested somewhere else to make the
firm more competitive, but leave the firm exposed to a high risk of noncompliance and the associated penalty and reputational costs that arise if a
violation is recognized. A firm at the upper left end of the compliance
frontier presents an aggressively low compliance risk profile. There is little
chance that such a firm will be found non-compliant, insulating itself from
the indirect and direct costs that arise from breaking the rules. However,
such a firm achieves that low risk state at a great, indeed inefficiently great,
cost of resources. The firm spends more on compliance than it generates in
risk reduction return. Those resources lost cannot be allocated elsewhere to

Id.

Think of it as the maximum value that a company delivering a particular
product or service can create at a given cost, using the best available
technologies, skills, management techniques, and purchased inputs. The
productivity frontier can apply to individual activities, to groups of linked
activities such as order processing and manufacturing, and to an entire
company’s activities. When a company improves its operational effectiveness,
it moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require capital investment, different
personnel, or simply new ways of managing.
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65. The notion of compliance as a continuum has been indirectly applied in a variety of
contexts to conceptualize compliant conduct by an individual or a firm. See, e.g., Sarah B.
Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1035–
36 (2009) (describing a tax compliance continuum); Bergstrom et al., supra note 25, at 148
(discussing health care provider compliance as a continuum).
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64. A helpful, albeit highly simplified, description of the productivity function is
presented in Michael E. Porter, What is Strategy?, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 62 (1996).
Porter explains:
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advance the enterprise.66
Viewed in dynamic terms, the concavity of the compliance frontier
determines the nature of the tradeoff between investment and risk, with the
firm investing more or less in compliance initiatives, as illustrated by the
following figure:

FIGURE 3. VARIATIONS
COMPLIANCE FRONTIERS

IN

THE

CONCAVITY

OF
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66. Firms in the center of the curve neither over nor underinvest in compliance form a
subject that will be discussed in more detail with a more complex model later in this Article.
See infra Part IV.
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In Figure 3, the straight line (a) would represent a compliance frontier
in which investments in compliance and non-compliance penalties are
perfect substitutes. A perfect substitute would mean that investments and
non-compliance penalties have the same effect from the firm’s perspective.
Both represent expenditures that the firm must pay; whether to regulators
and the public or through private investments, the cost remains the same. If
investments and non-compliance penalties were perfect substitutes, firms
would be indifferent to compliance practices because the outcome would
be the same—an expenditure by the firm.
Compliance investments and non-compliance penalties are not perfect
substitutes, however, and replacement of one for the other changes the
overall equation. That imperfection in substitution is represented in the
model by the curved line. Different locations on the curve represent
different places where investments are cheaper than penalties or vice versa.
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The compliance frontier represented by curve (b), a weakly concave curve,
would represent some imperfect substitution. The compliance frontier
represented by curve (c) represents even less imperfect substitutes. The
greater the concavity of the curve, the less substitutable the investment and
penalty choices are on a compliance profile. The compliance frontier
represented by line (d) represents an unusual situation where the
incremental investments in compliance are so low per unit of risk reduction
that reducing risk as much as possible is always the best option. Every unit
of investment in compliance generates more than that unit of return in
reduced risk. Conversely, the compliance frontier represented by line (e)
represents another unusual situation where compliance investments are so
incrementally costly that the firm’s best incentive is to not invest at all and
simply pay whatever penalties arise. Any unit of investment will not result
in an equal or greater reduction in risk, and such investments are therefore
inefficient.
III.

THE EFFICIENT INVESTMENT-RISK MODEL OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE

A. Impediments to Efficient Compliance
Firms explicitly or tacitly assume a compliance profile that represents
a mix of compliance investment and risk exposure. Another variable that
must be considered is the problem of information frictions, which can
impede the acquisition and utilization of full knowledge required in order
for a firm to make an optimal decision. Frictions occur when employees
lack sufficient knowledge about the compliance profile of the firm.
Employees may not have received correct or complete information about
the compliance goals, corporate culture, or organizational risks of the
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As described above, a firm’s decision to comply incorporates an
inverse production function expressed as a compliance frontier. However,
compliance in practice is inefficient due to the inability of firms to assess
and weigh the tradeoffs between investment in compliance and risk of noncompliance. To address this problem, the following discussion builds on
this compliance function to develop the efficient investment-risk (EIR)
model. The EIR model applies the economic concepts of technical
efficiency and allocative efficiency to compliance in order to identify the
inputs used by firms to most efficiently expend and allocate limited
resources towards compliance.
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enterprise.67 These agents, typically employees, will be out of sync with
what the firm wants to achieve in compliance.68 Thus, employees may act
in suboptimal fashion, either by overweighting compliance at the expense
of potential opportunities or underweighting compliance and exposing the
company to unnecessary compliance risk.
Even if the optimal state of compliance is fully known to an
enterprise, and that information is at least theoretically available, employee
decision-making may prevent the firm from realizing optimal compliance.
Employees may embody the classic principal-agent problem, in that their
actions serve their own self-interest at the expense of the firm. For
example, a temporary salesperson responsible for selling his or her
company’s products to foreign governments may be more willing to violate
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)69 because the value of a shortterm commission exceeds the risk of individual liability. A violation of the
FCPA may come at a high price of non-compliance to the firm as
principal,70 which the employee as agent does not fully internalize.71 In
addition, the predisposition of the human mind toward mental shortcuts and
assumptions often impairs individual decision-making.72 Such rationality
intends to be rational, but only limitedly,73 and can result in decisions that
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67. This happens as law becomes endogenous within organizations, and the meaning
and interpretation of law becomes increasingly institutionalized within organizational
structures. Edelman & Talesh, supra note 12, at 109–10. Edelman and Talesh posit that
these organizational structures can be exposed to the judiciary, which in time may shape
constructions of law. Id. at 110.
68. Id. at 109–10.
69. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2012)).
70. See David Hess, Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 42, 42–43 (2012)
(noting the sharp increase in FCPA enforcement activity since 2007 and characterizing
FCPA enforcement risk as “a top issue for corporate legal and compliance departments”).
71. See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 15
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 20–22 (2012) (citing evidence of the lack of individual prosecutions
relative to corporate FCPA enforcement actions); Yockey, supra note 55, at 354–55 (noting
the principal-agent problem in anti-corruption enforcement and observing that FCPA
sanctions are primarily borne by organizations).
72. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956) (“Since the organism . . . has neither the senses nor the wits
to discover an ‘optimal’ path . . . [it will apply] a choice mechanism that will lead it to
pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some specified level of all
of its needs.”). See generally Jon Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669,
670–72 (1996) (discussing the limits cognitive heuristics can impose on reasoning and
decision-making).
73. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1090 n.4 (1981) (describing bounded rationality as “intendedly rational, but only
limit[ly] so” (citations intentionally omitted)).
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generate unnecessary exposure to penalties or authorize expenditures that
cause overinvestment. The cognitive limits of individual employees have a
collective impact on the organization, which the firm’s decision-makers
may not be able to recognize.74 The frictions and bounds of information
create an environment where a firm may not be able to reach its own
optimal preferences. Therefore, firms must develop systems and processes
to ensure their compliance function is both efficient and effective.
Firms building risk-compliant systems and processes are pursuing
what is defined as technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is the ability
of a firm to produce a level of output with a minimum quantity of input.75
Such inputs include capital, labor, and equipment, which are used in a
fashion that does not waste resources.76 Firms identify relevant risks,
assess and evaluate those risks, and then respond to them in a fashion that
can be readily implemented and monitored over time.77 Investments can be
made in areas such as human resources, information technology, auditing,
legal, and compliance. This results in a reduced exposure to risk from noncompliance that can impair a firm’s reputation, trigger costly fines, impede
operations, or impact a firm’s long-term strategy.78
Technical efficiency, however, does not mean achieving compliance
at all costs.79 Firms can expose themselves to substantial risk of noncompliance and remain technically efficient if the returns on those risks are
sufficiently high.80 This cost-benefit approach requires executives to be
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74. See Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of
Disclosure, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 1059, 1080–84 (2011) (describing how individuals find it
difficult to undo biases in their own judgment when faced with new information).
75. R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic
Efficiency: A Study of A Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679, 690 (2000). See
also John A. Nyman & Simonetti Samuels, The Boren Amendment and Data Envelopment
Analysis, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 335, 339 (1997) (defining “technical efficiency” as
“produc[ing] a level of output (or outputs) using a technology that does not waste
resources”).
76. Nyman & Samuels, supra note 75, at 339–40 (discussing the interplay of labor,
capital, and technology to determine technical efficiency).
77. The
Risk
Intelligent
Chief
Compliance
Officer,
DELOITTE
13,
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Governance-RiskCompliance/dttl-grc-riskintelligentchiefcomplianceofficer.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2016)
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/8MAW-3ZZZ] (discussing the ERM and compliance risk management
processes).
78. Id. at 15 (describing how compliance problems can negatively impact certain areas,
including reputation, operations, strategy, and finance).
79. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 346
(1996) (noting that compliance without regard to costs is not desirable, as it can lead to too
much spending on compliance precautions).
80. DELOITTE, supra note 77, at 9 (noting that a company can incur inherent risk when
the potential returns outweigh the risk—this is a decision left to company leaders and their
perspectives on risk).
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81. Not only is perfect compliance unachievable, it is also inefficient. See Langevoort,
supra note 42, at 79 (“Within the securities business and elsewhere, there is no reasonable
expectation of, or even desire for, perfect compliance with law. . . . The optimal level of
compliance is one that balances the costs and benefits.”).
82. DELOITTE, supra note 77, at 9 (discussing that a company can have incur some risk
while also having a zero-tolerance policy for known compliance failures).
83. Id. at 9.
84. See KAREN PARSLEY & PHILOMENA CORRIGAN, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN
HEALTHCARE: PUTTING EVIDENCE INTO PRACTICE 5–6 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that focusing on
technical efficiency is “seductive” because it is easier to identify).
85. See Stacey English & Susannah Hammond, Cost of Compliance 2014, REUTERS 4
(2014),
https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/GRC00814.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/E43F-GTJD] (discussing the rising expenses and time investment of
compliance and compliance teams worldwide).
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able to accept residual risk and restrict that risk to a specific tolerance.81 At
the same time, firm leaders will have zero-tolerance for compliance failures
that fall outside of that accepted risk.82 As one useful analogy puts it,
“many people who run for fitness willingly tolerate a slightly higher risk of
joint injury (relative to non-runners) as a fair trade for running’s overall
benefits. That doesn’t mean they ignore it if their knees start to hurt.”83
The technically efficient firm is the active runner, reaching the potential
(though bounded) frontier of compliance practice by attaining the
maximum reduction of compliance risk with a minimum of cost, given the
firm’s culture and tolerance for acceptable risk.
The acquisition and attainment of technically efficient compliance can
be a seductive goal for the firm.84 Technical efficiency is easier to identify
through the relative rarity of non-compliant events. It is also easier to
display tangibly through technology and investments in human resources.
These investments, in turn, are visible and cognizable signals to the market
that a firm is doing its best to meet the state of the art of compliance
practices. Compliance investments are thus commonly reported as budget
increases, allocation of additional manpower, and capital investments—the
hallmarks of technical efficiency.85
Technical efficiency, however, is only one aspect that influences firm
behavior toward compliance. It does not necessarily satisfy a firm’s goal of
full economic efficiency. A firm may have utilized maximum resources
with minimum cost to achieve a particular compliant state, but it may also
have mismatched its resource allocations to achieve its overall optimal risk
profile. The result can place the firm in one of two possible states of
compliance. Firms can be over-compliant relative to the benefit they
receive for certain compliance allocations. Such firms may have achieved
a state of low compliance risk, but they have done so with an overexpenditure of resources that brings relatively little reduction of risk
relative to cost. Firms can also be under-compliant. Such firms do not
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make compliance investments that would provide an equal or greater
benefit to the firm in risk reduction relative to the compliance cost. Undercompliant firms leave themselves exposed to unnecessary risk that could be
rectified with measures less costly than the risk of exposure.
Both over-compliance and under-compliance can occur even if a firm
remains technically efficient. A firm may, for example, achieve state-ofthe-art compliance but do so in a way that costs too much relative to the
risk reduced. This requires that firms take into account the concept of
allocative efficiency, which represents a firm’s ability to use its inputs in
their most effective proportions in order to maximize the firm’s welfare.86
An allocatively efficient state of compliance is one that applies resources at
the state-of-the-art compliance but also does so in a fashion that optimally
balances cost and risk.87 While a technically efficient firm extracts
maximum output from a given use of resources,88 an allocatively efficient
firm represents the best possible use of a range of possible uses of
resources. For example, assume that a firm uses its compliance officers
only to process paperwork. If those compliance officers attain the
maximum paperwork processing possible given resources utilized, this
would be a technically efficient process. However, compliance officers
who are deployed to create innovative compliance systems and promote a
compliance culture, for example, would be more allocatively efficient than
their paper pushing equivalents.89
A firm must both be technically and allocatively efficient in order to
achieve the optimal state of firm compliance.90 Put simply, while technical
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86. Noel D. Uri, Technical Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency, and the Implementation of
a Price Cap Plan in Telecommunications in the United States, 4 J. APP. ECON. 163, 172
(2001). See also DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS
13 (2d ed. 2011) (defining allocative efficiency as the distribution of goods and services in
an economy to maximize social welfare).
87. See Grafton et al., supra note 75, at 690 (“A production process is allocatively
efficient in its input usage when the firm equates ratios of marginal products with the input
price ratios to minimize cost given output and input prices. Allocative efficiency (AE)
represents the reduction in production costs if production were both technically and
allocatively efficient, rather than technically efficient but allocatively inefficient.”).
88. Uri, supra note 86, at 172 n.7 (“TE measures only that portion of inefficiency that
could be eliminated by proportional reduction of inputs. It is the proximity of the data point
(y1, x1) to the facet of the piecewise linear envelopment surface. Even after reducing input
use by (1 - TE), however, some inputs may still exhibit slack (i.e., be used inefficiently).”).
89. See X-Inefficiency, WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X-inefficiency (last
visited Feb. 2, 2016) [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/U897-3TL5] (providing a useful example of a firm
using its brain surgeons to dig ditches to highlight the difference between technical and
allocative efficiency). See also Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency,
56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966) (comparing allocative efficiency to other types of economic
efficiency).
90. Grafton et al., supra note 75, at 683.
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efficiency achieves “doing right compliance,” allocative efficiency
describes a firm that is “doing compliance right.” Doing compliance right
is not easy. A variety of influential forces pulls firms away from allocative
efficiency and towards over- or under-compliance. One of the simplest
problems is that firms may misunderstand a rule as being more rigorous
than it is in reality and mismanage resources to meet perceived standards.
This may be due to a lack of information arising from inadequate
compliance or legal personnel or due to overcautious interpretations of
ambiguous standards.91
A firm’s risk culture can also encourage misallocation. An undercompliant risk culture may underestimate the likelihood of non-compliance
and overestimate its ability to navigate out of trouble when non-compliance
is brought to the attention of regulators. One of the most prominent
examples of an under-compliant risk culture is Citigroup’s prior to the
financial crisis of 2008.92 Citigroup’s risk models, and its overall cultural
attitude towards risk, did not account for the possibility that the national
housing boom on which it relied could experience a downturn.93 Such a
culture of risk attraction can create disincentives for compliance, and
unnecessarily expose the firm to harm.94
Less intuitive—but arguably no less relevant—is the possibility that a
firm’s culture can also encourage over-compliance. For corporations, the
locus of decision-making authority with respect to compliance resides with
the board of directors.95 The board of directors is subject to a duty to
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91. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (presenting under-compliance and overcompliance as two alternative paths when faced with uncertainty in legal standards and
noting the tendency toward over-compliance as more common); John E. Calfee & Richard
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV.
965, 966 (1984) (discussing how uncertainty may lead to over-compliance). But see Tom
Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446 (2004) (stating that the reaction to uncertainty in
regulation may also be a function of the risk aversion of the individual); Chin-Chin Yap,
The Tax Shelter Game, 59 TAX LAW. 1021, 1036 (2006) (stating in the taxation context that
“increased uncertainty induces greater compliance in risk averse individuals but induces
lower compliance of risk seeking individuals”).
92. See Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1323, 1345–58 (2010) (discussing the effects of Citigroup’s cultural norms); see
also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 71 (2014) (showing how Citigroup had a high-risk culture).
93. Willmarth, supra note 92, at 104.
94. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 114–22 (2003) (describing the impact of
corporate culture on the ineffectiveness of risk management).
95. Regulation incentivizes firms to institutionalize the board’s compliance oversight.
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a compliance program is deemed effective
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monitor compliance, established by the Delaware Chancery Court’s
decision In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,96 but may
not be able to easily do so due to their distance from day-to-day
management of the firm. The Caremark standard does not impose hair
trigger liability, as directors must either “utterly fail” to implement or
“consciously fail” to monitor an existing compliance program to be held at
fault.97 Nonetheless, board members, corporate managers, and executives
alike may be overly conservative because of their personal liability
exposure.98 A firm’s regulatory culture may be an important driver of overcompliance. Firms may have a tendency towards over-compliance due to a
disproportionate fear of sanction.99 Another benign interpretation is that
lawyers, because of their professional training and conduct standards, place
a paramount emphasis on process over result.100 The risk-averse tendencies
of lawyers may be heightened by accountability standards to which
corporate gatekeepers—such as corporate counsel as well as auditors and
compliance officers—are subject.101 This, in turn, creates a pressure within
the firm to attempt “absolute assurance” of compliant behavior, which is all
but impossible to achieve.102 Yet, efforts to achieve that absolute assurance
can certainly be made, creating a compliance culture that over-expends
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and thus eligible for credit or reduced sanctions if “[t]he organization’s governing authority
[is] knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program
and [ ] exercise[s] reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness
of the compliance and ethics program.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2015).
96. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
97. MILLER, supra note 1, at 63; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. LAW 967, 976–77 (2009). See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006) (confirming and clarifying the Caremark standard under Delaware law). But see
Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 111–12 (2006) (arguing that the business
judgment rule effectively precludes judicial scrutiny into the adequacy of a corporation’s
compliance program).
98. But see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 148–50
(2014) (noting that in practice, personal liability of corporate executives is sharply curtailed
by the prevalence of D&O indemnification and insurance agreements).
99. See Michael W. Peregrine, Caution by Company Officers Can Create Problems for
Boards, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/
business/dealbook/caution-by-company-officers-can-create-problems-for-boards.html
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/3PLG-K3TN] (arguing the self-protective conduct arising from fear of
personal legal liability may hinder certain company initiatives).
100. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 308–09 (2004) (demonstrating that the
business judgment rule leads lawyers to focus on process designs and controls).
101. Peregrine, supra note 99 (describing how corporate gatekeepers engage in selfprotective conduct at the potential expense of strategic firm initiatives).
102. Cunningham, supra note 100, at 308–09.
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resources relative to actual risk.
A less benign possibility is that over-compliance is being stoked by
professional service providers—such as compliance officers, auditors,
attorneys, and management consultants—that are incentivized to dramatize
or even exaggerate compliance risk in order to generate revenue or accrue
prestige and influence.103 This may be especially effective when legal
regimes are new and their implications uncertain.104 For example, when
wrongful discharge protections for employees were increasing in
prominence during the 1980s, human resources consultants applied
hyperbolic language to describe these legal innovations. The trade
literature was subjected to a steady stream of publications citing the
“epidemic,” “avalanche,” and “explosion” of employment litigation.105
Managers during that time period learned of exceptional cases with very
large jury awards, warnings about jury bias against employers, and the
looming threat of massive punitive damages.106 This hyperbole may have
increased the professional influence of consultants and perhaps the amount
of business they could generate.107
More recent reforms may have attracted a similar increase in
consultative influence. The financial regulatory reforms enacted over the
past fifteen years have been a substantial driver of external compliance
costs. To cite one prominent example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
implemented new corporate reporting mandates.108 Audit and law firms, in
particular, sought to exploit the costs associated with SOX non-compliance
to corporate boards.109 More recently, advocates for the emerging
corporate compliance field have emphasized liability risk from sanctions
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103. Krawiec, supra note 52, at 528–32 (describing the self-interested role of legal
compliance professionals, which include lawyers, ethics and compliance consultants, and
internal compliance personnel). See also Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law
Consultants”, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2006) (discussing the emergence of the law
consulting industry in areas such as compliance)
104. See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 529–30 (noting how legal compliance professionals
economically benefit from incomplete or vague legal rules).
105. Lauren B. Edelman, Steven B. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Professional
Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47,
64–68 (1992).
106. Id. at 68.
107. Id. at 76–77.
108. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified in sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C. (2012)). These mandates require, most notably, that companies certify and attest
to their financial statements and disclose information regarding their internal controls and
financial reporting procedures. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2012).
109. Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revising
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 966–68,
971–72 (2006).
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under the Dodd-Frank Act110 and other new regulatory regimes as
justification for bolstering in-house compliance functions.111
B. Risk-Intelligence Compliance Through an Efficient Investment-Risk
Model
Regardless of the source, firms are subjected to significant internal
and external pressures to over-comply or under-comply with regulations.
How firms determine their allocative efficiency and technical efficiency
depends upon a given firm’s regulatory and resource mix. This view may
be conceptualized in a dynamic, multi-variable model of corporate
compliance that accounts for a firm’s risk aversion, technical efficiency
investments, allocative efficiency positioning, and its specific internal and
external regulatory environments. This efficient investment-risk (EIR)
model is shown in the following figure:

The curved line represents the compliance frontier—i.e., the sum of all
existing best practices for compliance with a particular regulation by a
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110. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
111. See John G. Browning, Why Chief Compliance Officers are More Important than
Ever, D MAG. 2–4 (July-Aug. 2013), http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/dceo/2013/july-august/why-chief-compliance-officers-are-more-important-than-ever
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/53N5-TZUK] (describing the role of compliance professional
membership organizations, such as Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and the
Health Care Compliance Association).
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112. It is possible that a firm making no investments in compliance may still achieve a
compliance state due to the moral compulsion of certain firm’s employees to comply even
without support from their employer, investments in place for unrelated reasons that happen
to promote compliance, or sheer luck.
113. See Edwin G. Foulke Jr., Managing an OSHA Inspection: Former OSHA Chief
Advises Employers to Address ‘Low-Hanging Fruit,’ OSHA GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES NEWSL., Feb. 2013, at 4 (advising the correction of “low-hanging fruit” as an
easy way to avoid citations and fines).
114. See Killingsworth, supra note 32, at 986 (“Examples of low-hanging fruit . . .
include consideration of ethical leadership and compliance in performance reviews,
compensation and promotion decisions, especially for managers; recognition of employees
who have conspicuously done ‘the right thing’ in difficult situations; and time off or a pizza
party for the work group that finishes compliance training first.”).
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particular firm. The compliance frontier assumes that investments in
compliance and penalties from compliance are moderately imperfect
substitutes. While investments can reduce penalties, for example, the ratio
of investments made to penalties reduced changes according to the quantity
of investments made, similar to the decision firms actually face in a
competitive and regulated market. The firm can choose a high-risk, lowcost compliance strategy that keeps compliance cheap but exposes the
company to potential liability. Conversely, the firm can invest heavily in
compliance and minimize most risks, but at great expense. The concave
curve represents the continuum of optimal compliance practices given a
particular risk-cost combination by the enterprise. Most firms would be
somewhere “above” the compliance frontier, striving both to minimize
their risk of compliance and reduce the cost of doing so.
TE represents the risk-combinations at the compliance frontier. A
firm reaching a point on TE has achieved technical efficiency for its riskcost profile. That firm is using its resources most effectively given its risk
culture and environment. It is important to note that such combinations
along the TE frontier are curvilinear, and not simply linear, in nature. If the
TE curve represented a linear relationship (specifically, that of a diagonal
line running from TEb to TEa), the choice of risk-cost combinations firms
would be irrelevant. Any choice along the line would be as efficient as the
next.
However, the risk-cost relationship that arises from compliance tends
to be curvilinear in nature. A firm at TEb has made few, if any, investments
in regulatory compliance and is at a high risk of non-compliance.112 For
such “low-hanging fruit,” firms can substantially reduce their risk exposure
with only a minimum of resources.113 This may be as simple as informing
employees of the need for compliance and to be aware of issues that may
arise. Reward programs for compliant behavior can incentivize employees
and also convey positive cultural message with little effort.114 Investments
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115. See Jeffrey J. Sama, Environmental Permits in the Next Century: The DEC’s
Deputy Permit Administrator Outlines His Recipe for Reform, 1 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
15, 21 (1995) (noting in the environmental context that “selective and targeted compliance
activities provide a lot more ‘bang for the buck,’ and preserve the benefits of regulatory
reform while enabling compliance staff to devote the bulk of their time to high risk and
environmentally sensitive regulated activities”).
116. This assumes that the firm has reached TE. Firms that have not achieved technical
efficiency will be limited by their own bounded curve with the same curvilinear shape as TE
but one closer to AEb or even AEa.
117. See Daniel Clough, Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25
MELB. U. L. REV. 551, 555 (2001) (defining the relationship between technical and
allocative efficiency).
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like these are easy to implement and generate significant “bang” for the
compliance “buck.”115 As firms make these investments, they move on the
TE curve from TEb toward TEi.116 Each investment in compliance generates
a proportionally greater return in the form of reduced compliance risk.
Over time, as the metaphorical low-hanging fruit of compliance is
plucked, returns on compliance investments decline. Once the firm passes
TEi, the cost of compliance increases at a marginal rate greater than the
return it provides in reduced risk of non-compliance. Compliance
investments at this state are not worth their return on investment to the
firm. As a firm approaches TEa, compliance investments are highly costly
and generate little if any additional risk-reduction return. For example, if
employees were required to attend daily one-hour compliance meetings and
change their passwords on an hourly basis, it might improve regulatory
compliance, nudging the firm towards TEa, but do so at an unacceptably
high productivity cost to the enterprise. Where firms fall on the curve is
determined by the firm’s risk-cost profile.
The AE line represents a firm’s pursuit of allocative efficiency.
Moving from the most inefficient state at AEa, a firm pursues allocative
efficiency along the diagonal line until it reaches AEi. Firms positioned at
AEb, or elsewhere on the AE line, represent firms that are using compliance
inputs in their optimal proportion without achieving the technical efficiency
necessary to drive their risk-cost profile toward AEi. While technical
efficiency is a necessary precondition to achieve allocative efficiency,117
such firms on the AE line are already “doing compliance right,” but simply
need to improve their efficiency in investments to achieve both technical
and allocative efficiency. These firms could be thought of as allocatively
sub-efficient, insofar that they have achieved optimal proportional use of
resources but need to generate efficient input use.
The point AEi, TEi represents the point at which a firm achieves both
technical and allocative efficiency. At this point, the firm has achieved the
greatest reduction in non-compliance risk relative to the cost of compliance
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118. See infra Part IV.
119. See Caroline H. Bledsoe et al., Regulating Creativity: Research and Survival in the
IRB Iron Cage, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 608 (2007) (noting that “managers intentionally
overestimate risk to create wide margins of safety in order to avoid inefficiency and avert
costly accidents. Instituted as precautionary measures in the forms of additional rules and
insistence on strict adherence to the formalized procedures of the organization, these
margin-of-safety measures, originally intended to ensure that the organization’s goals are
met, become the overriding concern.”).
120. See Yockey, supra note 55, at 358 (noting the problem of “check the boxes”
compliance programs caused by static, rigid regulatory requirements). See also supra text
accompanying notes 98–101.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
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invested. Any increases in compliance investment from this point would
bring decreasing risk-reduction returns.
Also, any reductions in
compliance investment would bring disproportionally increasing exposure
to non-compliance. AEi, TEi represents the optimal point for a firm’s
compliance function. In a perfectly efficient compliance system, firms
would seek to reach this point. Accordingly, we refer to this point as the
compliance equilibrium. As we explore further in this Article, there are
multiple forces exerted by the regulator and the firm that preclude the
regulator-firm relationship from achieving a stable compliance
equilibrium.118
Finally, it bears noting the profile of firms in the inefficient spaces
behind the frontier. Firms in the RPa field represent enterprises that overinvest in compliance relative to their reduction in risk. Such firms are
typically bureaucratically heavy enterprises with a conservative attitude
toward risk.119 Investments in this space may be prominent through the use
of easily recognizable forms and procedures. However, such process may
do little to actually reduce risk or do so at an unsustainable cost to
productivity. A principal-agent problem may push a firm towards RPa,
such as when managers expend disproportionate resources to preserve
compliance in order to avoid hurting their own careers for non-compliant
decisions. Managers situated in a “don’t stick your neck out” culture are
incentivized to create overly conservative or cumbersome compliance
programs in order to avoid personal reputational or liability risk.120
Corporate boards may also overvalue compliance vis-a-vis their firms’ riskcost profiles in order to protect their own reputations.121
Firms in the RPb space represent enterprises that underinvest in
compliance. Such firms may have a risk attractive culture that encourages
business gambles for the lure of a high return. In such firms, a compliance
department may be understaffed or non-existent. Lawyers and other
authorities on regulation may be marginalized due to their perceived
unimportance. Managers may have had a negative experience with the
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legal environment and thus have a negative view on the purpose and goals
of regulation.122 This may create a culture where, while compliance issues
are widely known, few take responsibility for managing the compliance
function.
IV.

THE CHOICE OF REGULATORY RULES AND THE IMPACT OF
REGULATOR OVERSIGHT ON FIRM RESPONSES TO
REGULATION

The EIR model can be used to analyze how regulators and regulated
firms interact. Regulators are interested in achieving specific policy goals,
and ideally would prefer that all firms achieve perfect compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. Regulators use a number of different
kinds of legal authority to encourage firms to comply with a rule, thus
shifting firms away from a high risk of non-compliance (such as TEi) and
toward a low risk of non-compliance (shifting leftward on the x-axis). The
ex ante choice of rule affects how firms comply and the dynamic nature of
the regulator-firm relationship over time.
The following discussion begins by defining the three major
categories of regulatory mandates. Then it proceeds by examining the
impact of these different types of rules on firm compliance, the regulator’s
relationship with the firm, and the achievement of regulatory objectives.
A. Types of Regulatory Rules: Direct, Collaborative, and Market
Contingent Regulation
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122. See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV.
61, 84 (2011) (explaining various reasons why managers tend to have negative views
towards the legal environment).
123. Malloy, supra note 26, at 531 n.1 (referring to “direct regulation” or “traditional
regulation”).
124. Id.
125. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1235–36
(1995) (explaining the characteristics of command-and-control regulation as well as its
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The legal authority that structures the behavior of firms may be
categorized in three basic archetypes of regulation. The first type of
regulatory approach consists of governmental mandates that fall under
traditional command-and-control regulation, which we collectively refer to
as “Direct Regulation”.123 Under this rubric, governments use coercive
powers to mandate the regulated firm’s compliance with statutorily defined
regulatory objectives through the threat of investigation, civil fines, and
criminal prosecution.124 Command-and-control regulation operates in a
top-down manner that relies heavily on active governmental oversight.125
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The second type of regulatory approach consists of various hybrid
forms of governance in which the regulator leverages its relationship with
private governance regimes and firm- or industry-based self-regulation.
Described by various scholars as New Governance,126 reflexive
regulation,127 responsive regulation,128 co-regulation,129 negotiated
governance,130 decentered regulation,131 or other related theories,132 we
collectively refer to them as “Collaborative Regulation” in order to
distinguish them from the governmentally established forms of Direct
Regulation.
Collaborative Regulation is distinguishable from Direct Regulation in
two ways: the nature of the regulator-regulatee relationship and the tools of
regulation.
First, Collaborative Regulation is based on ongoing
deliberation and communication between the regulator and regulated
firms.133 While Direct Regulation is based on the administrative state as the
sole locus of power to regulate, Collaborative Regulation is premised on a
“collaborative, cooperative enterprise of shaping social outcomes through
negotiation among numerous public and private actors with stakes in those
outcomes”.134 In a Collaborative Regulation framework, government
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merits).
126. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (demonstrating
a shift from formal regulation to the idea of a “New Governance” that combines both public
and private actors).
127. See Orts, supra note 125; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983) (articulating the theory of reflexive law).
128. See IAN AYRES AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3–4 (1992) (exploring how better policy proposals can result
from working with the symbiotic interaction between state regulation and self-regulation).
129. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010) (examining how public regulation can encourage
workplace self-governance).
130. See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 489 n.9 (listing various alternative names).
131. See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2002)
(noting the various connotations of the term “decentered regulation”).
132. See Kevin Kolben, Dialogic Labor Regulation in the Global Supply Chain, 37
MICH. J. INT’L L. 425, 430–31 (2015).
133. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based
Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2008) (describing a new regulatory
system with a more interactive role for regulated entities by accepting input from these
regulated entities).
134. Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 427 (2011). See Robert F. Weber, New
Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 783, 836–37
(2010) (distinguishing New Governance from command-and-control regulation).
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regulators share responsibility for achieving policy goals with both firms
and society generally.135 In many instances, regulatory authority is
devolved from national governmental agencies to subsidiary bodies and
civil society actors.136 In a number of prominent cases, Collaborative
Regulation is the basis for multi-stakeholder initiatives that establish new
areas of regulation.137 Collaborative Regulation is particularly appealing as
a means to address transnational regulatory problems—such as
environmental protection, labor rights, and financial capital flows—where
governmental regulators and intergovernmental organizations are not able
to effectively regulate the cross-border activities of multinational
corporations.138
Second, Collaborative Regulation is defined by the mode of regulation
itself. Eschewing the exclusive use of rules, Collaborative Regulation
often relies on principles-based regulation, which provides the regulator
with the autonomy to determine what conduct is permissible on the basis of
an underlying evaluative framework.139 Instead of drawing precise, bright
line rules between prohibited and permissible conduct, principles-based
regulation consists of standards that are flexibly applied by regulators in
different ways depending on the specific factual context.140 Collaborative
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135. See Lobel, supra note 126, at 344 (describing the recent shift to a collaborative
governance model “in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for
achieving policy goals”).
136. Kolben, supra note 132, at 432.
137. See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and
Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 457, 471–91 (2004) (analyzing three
transnational, multi-stakeholder initiatives: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative).
138. Kolben, supra note 132, at 434–35. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance:
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541–45 (2009)
(identifying the features of transnational New Governance regulatory schemes); Eric J. Pan,
Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision:
Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 262–63 (2010) (describing
the role of private standard setting bodies in international financial regulation). See also
Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions:
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 6–14 (2014)
(proposing a framework for analyzing the interactions between Collaborative Regulation
actors).
139. See Ford, supra note 133, at 6–7 (describing the difference between rules and
principles and the scholarly debate surrounding these two concepts). See also Dan Awrey,
Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 273, 281–97 (2011) (arguing for more principles-based financial regulation).
140. See Awrey, supra note 139, at 276–78 (describing the differences between rules
and principles and the advantages and disadvantages of both). As legal scholars have noted,
however, this distinction should not be overemphasized. Any given regulatory system may
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Regulation-based standards include quantitative indicators, industry
benchmarks and best practices, and voluntary reporting initiatives.141
The third type of regulatory approach encompasses a range of
regulatory mandates, including private rights of action, market-leveraging
taxes, fees, and permits, and mandatory disclosure regimes.142 Unlike
Direct Regulation, these regulatory approaches do not mandate a specific
action on the part of regulated firms. Nor do they necessarily incorporate
the decentralized, public-private governance of Collaborative Regulation.
Instead, these forms of “Market Contingent Regulation” seek to influence
firm behavior by providing incentives or signals to regulated firms. The
achievement of the regulator’s objective is contingent on firms responding
to these incentives or signals.
Market Contingent Regulation is an interstitial category. It includes
parallel forms of regulation that may be categorized either as Direct
Regulation, Collaborative Regulation, or a hybrid of the two.143 Mandatory
disclosure—arguably the most important and prevalent regulatory
technique in the United States—reflects this trait.144 Laws mandating the
public reporting of a firm’s financial condition and business activities
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include both rules-based and principles-based elements, and any given rule or principle may
be applied in a manner that belies easy classification. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A
Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law,
Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1417–25 (2007) (analyzing
the tension in the classification of rules and principles and expressing skepticism about the
feasibility of describing or designing a principles-based or rules-based system). See also
Ford, supra note 133, at 9–10 (acknowledging the limitations of the rules-principles
dichotomy).
141. See David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects
of Achieving Corporate Accountability through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 453–
57 (2007) (analyzing corporate environmental and social reporting as New Governance
regulation); Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate
Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 590–606 (2013) (analyzing the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI), a leading voluntary corporate reporting framework).
142. See Ford, supra note 133, at 26–27, 29–31, 36–40 (describing property-, market-,
and information-based public regulation).
143. See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 23–53 (2015) (providing a comparative
taxonomy of parallel forms of public environmental law and private environmental
governance); Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1669–74 (2015)
(comparing governmental and private rights of action).
144. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 652 (2011) (characterizing mandated disclosure as a “favored-weapon in
the arsenals of legislatures, courts, [and] administrative agencies”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 613, 613 (1999) (calling informational regulation “one of the most striking
developments in the last generation of American law”).
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undergird federal banking and securities regulation.145 These laws have a
coercive, command-and-control element insofar as they require regulated
firms to disclose information that they otherwise would not voluntarily
make public.146 On the other hand, the effectiveness of mandatory
disclosure is contingent on third party users (e.g., customers and investors)
being able and willing to make use of this information.147 The mandated
exchange of information between regulated firms and third party users
through this process is often directly linked to Collaborative Regulation.148
The coerciveness of mandatory disclosure regulation primarily depends on
two factors: (1) the discretion afforded to a regulated firm to determine
what to disclose; and (2) the possibility or probability of governmental
enforcement if the firm fails to disclose.149
In many cases, this
coerciveness is weak.150
The following figure compares select characteristics of these three
categories of regulation:
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145. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 144, at 658–59 (claiming that financial
disclosures are pervasive and reaches all domains of consumer protection); ARCHON FUNG,
MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 107–09 (2007) (arguing that despite the significant political power of
corporations, mandated financial disclosure requirements have gained more prominence
over time).
146. Ruth Jebe, Sustainability Reporting and New Governance: South Africa Marks the
Path to Improved Corporate Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 247 (2015).
147. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate
Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 95 (2014) (describing the discretionary reaction of
firms to stakeholder responses to disclosed information). See also Charlotte S. Alexander,
Transparency and Transmission: Theorizing Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market
Responses to Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 177, 193–95 (2015) (explaining how
regulators and outside interest groups use information disclosed by firms through
transparency mandates to enforce labor and employment laws).
148. See David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New
Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447,
467–73 (2008) (advocating for mandatory social reporting consistent with the GRI
guidelines); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1301–03 (1999) (suggesting that the SEC
should supervise social reporting modeled on existing private reporting frameworks and
industry best principles).
149. See Jebe, supra note 146, at 252–54 (discussing the inadequacies of existing
mandatory environmental and social disclosure regimes, namely the concept of materiality
and the weaknesses of enforcement mechanisms).
150. See id. at 253 (citing Sweden and France as examples of mandatory reporting
systems with weak enforcement mechanisms). To empower third party users, Aaron Dhir
has proposed that social disclosure be used to empower corporate shareholders through the
shareholder proposal mechanism.
Aaron A. Dhir, The Politics of Knowledge
Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 47, 65–76 (2009).
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Actors

Means of
enforcement

Direct
Regulation

Collaborative
Regulation

Government
regulators,
regulated firms

Regulators, firms,
civil society
representatives
(e.g., NGOs)

Civil and
criminal
sanctions

Private standards
(e.g.,
membership
rules), often in
addition to Direct
Regulation
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Market
Contingent
Regulation
Government
regulators,
regulated firms,
market-based
third parties (e.g.,
customers,
investors)
Market forces
intermediated
through third
parties

Prominent
example

U.S. federal
emissions rules

Fair Labor
Association
standards

Coercion on
regulated firms

Periodic
reporting
requirements
under the U.S.
Securities and
Exchange Act of
1934

High

Low

Varies

B. The Impact of Choice of Rule on Firm Compliance
The EIR model illuminates the impact of the choice of regulatory rules
and illustrates the potential interactions between them. As a business
regulatory approach, Collaborative Regulation has its greatest potential for
influence when the firm is at a high-risk state of non-compliance (such as
TEi). Collaborative Regulation can help the firm move toward a lower risk
of non-compliance. Both the regulator and the firm can benefit from
collaboration based on Collaborative Regulation principles.
This
interactive cycle begins with firms signaling their commitment to the
policy goals of the regulator. This may be accomplished by making public
disclosures of firm practices and commitments through self-reporting and
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self-policing,151 social and environmental reporting,152 active participation
in stakeholder-based governance regimes,153 and engaging in nonexploitative behavior toward regulatory mandates.154 Regulators, in turn,
respond to the firm’s commitment to regulatory goals by allocating
resources away from the monitoring function and de-escalate toward a nonconfrontational posture.155 The regulator further responds by developing
partnerships with the firm as well as sharing expertise. At this point, the
firm is not only better understanding the goals and attitudes of regulatory
agency, but also learning how best to comply effectively from the very
entity that is in charge of enforcing compliance. This, in turn, can promote
still further investments in regulatory compliance, which still further
deepen the relationship of trust, broaden the exchange of information, and
decrease the costs of monitoring for both sides.156
This self-reinforcing cycle of compliance, relationship building, and
information exchange creates a state of what is often characterized as metaregulation.157 In a meta-regulatory partnership, the government observes
firm behavior only at a distance, focuses not on monitoring but rather on
evaluating a firm’s compliance function and controls, and ensures they
function properly.158 Instead of conformance with rules, regulation
becomes a means for regulators to encourage firms to implement and
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151. See Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does
Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. ECON. 609, 638–40
(2011) (finding “evidence that self-reporting can reliably indicate effectively implemented
self-policing and that regulators are, in fact, using self-reporting to identify firms that are
meaningfully monitoring their own operations”).
152. See Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to
Global Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 298–302 (2015) (noting the
role of disclosure regimes in promoting communication of adverse environmental and social
impacts between firms, regulators, and stakeholders).
153. See id. at 302–06 (describing assessment and feedback mechanisms through publicprivate, multi-stakeholder initiatives).
154. Cf. Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 14–15
(2008) (noting how certain firms exploit textual weaknesses in regulation).
155. This de-escalation is represented by an enforcement pyramid, which illustrates the
various coercive and persuasive strategies a regulator may utilize to exert a pull to
compliance over a firm. These can be weak or strong given the severity of the noncompliance or strength of the emerging partnership. Neil Gunningham, Strategizing
Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond, in EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION, supra note 12, at 199, 203.
156. See Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy of Regulation as a
Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 581, 602 (2011) (noting that “over time, the justice perceptions
of individuals working together are said to converge”).
157. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
AND DEMOCRACY 245–91 (2002) (defining and examining the concept of meta-regulation).
158. Gunningham, supra note 155, at 200, 211–16.
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sustain best practices for their internal compliance controls.159 Regulators
can also disseminate information about how firms need to comply, as well
as which strategies are most cost-effective to make compliance happen.
The regulator can reduce information barriers the firm possesses about
understanding a regulation and what can be done to efficiently meet the
regulation’s requirements. This may result in the creation of new
Collaborative Regulation-based regimes to enable regulators and firms to
share information and generate surplus.160 In essence, the regulator can
inform the regulated firm how to more efficiently comply, and thereby
lower its risk profile at a greater proportion to the cost of the firm’s
investment in compliance. A combination of regulatory interventions
based on Collaborative Regulation may reinforce each other: the ability of
regulators and regulated firms to communicate and collaborate leads to
more contextual, shared understandings of their respective and shared
policy goals, which are manifested as standards, and vice versa.161
As regulation innovates over time, it is shaped by both regulatory
objectives and the responses of firms, as well as external stakeholders
contributing their expertise and expressing their preferences.162 As part of
this process, regulators often directly involve regulated firms in the process
of developing the standards to which they are held accountable.163 This
partnership in governance helps ensure that future compliance standards are
both efficiently written and substantively effective. Firms that participate
in the creation of standards become agents in the regulatory process instead
of mere subjects of regulation.164 In doing so, firms are motivated to invest
in internal compliance functions and to view compliance as a means to
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159. Id. at 211.
160. Among such measures are informational regulation measures, such as encouraging
and facilitating the voluntary disclosure of information through New Governance-style
industry-based reporting mechanisms. See Jamie Darin Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford,
Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
451, 487–91 (2014) (describing industry-level conflict minerals due diligence and reporting
programs).
161. Awrey, supra note 139, at 288–89.
162. See Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: A Research
Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 472 (2008) (describing organizations’ inclusion of
both “maximizing profits and serving the interests of shareholders” when defining corporate
responsibility).
163. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of Banking, 39 J.
CORP. L. 459, 474 (2014) (“. . . if people within regulated entities are engaged with
regulators or representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) in developing the
voluntary standards for actions, there is a good possibility of creating greater trust between
the parties, and a state of shared values and mutual problem-solving that should lead to
better compliance with the content of the standards.”).
164. Ford, supra note 133, at 30 (“Requiring firms to fill in the content of those
principles themselves makes firms agents rather than subjects of regulation.”).
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fulfill underlying principles of responsible business practice, instead of
merely “cosmetic compliance.”165 Thus, perceiving compliance as a longterm investment, rather than a one-time cost-benefit decision, can help
build a partnership between regulator and regulatee that makes present
compliance more efficient and future regulation more responsive and
effective.166 In certain circumstances, a Collaborative Regulation-based
approach to standard-setting can enable norms of compliance to spread
within a firm167 or among firms through processes of socialization.168
This regulator-regulatee relationship is not only laudable from a policy
perspective but it may also be efficient from a firm-oriented
microeconomic perspective. When the regulator and the firm exhibit trust
and cooperation towards one another, which is an act foundationally
characteristic of Collaborative Regulation, each relaxes their posture with
respect to the compliance function. Regulators that trust that the enterprise
is committed to satisfactory compliance practices can spend fewer
resources monitoring and enforcing rules against the firm. The firm, in
turn, under reduced threat of investigation, dedicates fewer resources to
defending against actual or potential challenges by the regulator against the
enterprise. This mutual relaxation of resources, based upon trust, creates a
resource surplus that both firm and agency can share.169 Regulators benefit
from this posture because they can allocate their limited monitoring assets
elsewhere, and can also more readily gather information about the firm’s
compliance practices.170 Firms benefit from this posture by reducing their
exposure to external audits, investigations, and penalties.171 In terms of the
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165. Id. at 29–30.
166. See, e.g., Fiona Haines, Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A
Characteristic Analysis of the Aftermath of Disaster, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 57 (2009)
(“Newer forms of regulation such as metaregulation can, as demonstrated here, play a
valuable role in maintaining integrity between regulatory goals, procedures, and site
practices.”).
167. See David E. DePianto, Sticky Compliance: An Endowment Account of Expressive
Law, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 327, 336–39 (2014) (describing how the expression of law as
social norms can promote compliance).
168. See Park, supra note 147, at 117–20 (describing the expressive dimension of
mandatory social disclosure); see also Ford, supra note 133, at 28 (“The enforcement of
law, like law itself, serves an expressive purpose. Regulatory approval . . . confers
legitimacy on firm operations . . . .”).
169. Williams & Conley, supra note 163, at 474 (discussing that regulator-regulatee
conversation can build trust and understanding).
170. Ford, supra note 133, at 30–31; see Lobel, supra note 126, at 398–99 (describing
New Governance-style feedback and learning, which helps keep regulation from being
outdated).
171. See Ford, supra note 133, at 34–36 (discussing the benefits of this form of
regulation, which encourages responsible firms to believe that regulatory actions are not
arbitrary and their good behavior will be rewarded).
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EIR model, Collaborative Regulation enables firms to shift leftward along
the TE compliance curve away from TEb by investing in compliance
practices that generate risk reduction benefits that outweigh the initial cost.
In addition to the previously mentioned low-hanging fruit that the firm
discovers on its own, Collaborative Regulation creates a robust mechanism
by which firms move toward a more efficient state of compliance.
C. The Limits of Collaborative Regulation and the Effects of Direct
Regulation and Market Contingent Regulation

C M
Y K

04/17/2017 09:23:23

172. See generally Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational
Motivations for Corporate Giving: Complementing Economic Theory with Organization
Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1035 (1997) (discussing reasons for differences in
corporate giving behavior).
173. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2014).
174. See Joseph W. Yockey, The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise, 4 MICH. BUS.
& ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 19 (2014) (discussing value-based compliance’s emphasis
on agents who “intuitively consider every organizational priority when approaching any
situation” and in turn, “behave responsibly and in the ways the organization prefers . . . .”);
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 89, 99 (2015) (reviewing legal scholars’ discussions of social enterprise and their
focus on commitment).
175. Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231,
232 (2014); see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
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The effectiveness of Collaborative Regulation as a means of
compelling firm compliance, however, is inherently limited. One reason
that Collaborative Regulation is successful is that it creates a shared surplus
arising from resource sharing, cooperation, and trust building measures.
This effect can potentially bring the enterprise to compliance equilibrium,
(i.e., TEi, AEi) where the firm is both technically and allocatively efficient
in its compliance practices. In other words, the firm has achieved the
greatest risk reduction for the least possible cost. A firm may move beyond
compliance equilibrium for a time. It may be motivated by altruism
towards the regulatory goal or a values-driven ethical commitment to the
objectives of the agency that supersedes profit-making.172
The firm may, through legal mechanisms, consolidate a more durable
commitment to compliance beyond the law. One prominent avenue is by
organizing as a social enterprise, which uses revenue-producing
commercial activity to pursue the common good as its primary purpose.173
This enables an altruistic-minded firm to “lock in” socially minded, valuesbased compliance behavior that furthers the regulator’s public goals.174
Statutes recognizing social enterprise companies have been enacted in
various forms by over one-half of U.S. states.175 Most prominent among
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them is the benefit corporation statute, which has been adopted by twentysix states and the District of Columbia.176 Under many of these statutes, a
social enterprise must include a “mission lock” provision in its charter that
permits the amendment of the entity’s public benefit or social purpose only
upon a supermajority vote of shareholders.177 Despite their commitments to
furthering the public good beyond general business regulation, benefit
corporations have demonstrated deficiencies in complying with the selfimposed heightened legal requirements to which they are subject under
benefit corporation statutes.178
Apart from social enterprises, a firm’s commitment to comply with
law beyond the compliance equilibrium is often ephemeral, however. Firm
ownership or management may change. Managers may not be certain how
to address and reconcile competing firm goals and social policy goals.
There may be differing views among managers, executives, and owners
qua corporate shareholders concerning who and what should benefit from
the firm’s altruism.179
Firm management may feel pressured by
shareholders to optimize compliance costs.180
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Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2012)
(discussing benefit corporation, low-profit limited liability company, and flexible purpose
corporation statutes). A related, but distinct, organizational strategy is the for-profit
philanthropic organization. See generally Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and
Creative Capitalism:
A Historical and Comparative Perspective on Social
Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1121 (2013)
(arguing that for-profit philanthropic organizations are part of a long history of
philanthropy, and that important philanthropic benefits occur when firms take their business
innovations and ideas and apply them to philanthropic endeavors).
176. Plerhoples, supra note 174, at 105.
177. Id. at 127. Connecticut’s benefit corporation statute takes this principle one step
further by permitting a benefit corporation to adopt a legacy preservation provision in its
certificate of incorporation. Once adopted, this provision requires that, upon the firm’s
dissolution, its assets be distributed either to one or more charitable organizations or other
benefit corporations that have adopted this provision. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1355
(2015).
178. See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25
(2015) (determining that, based on survey data, compliance with benefit corporation
reporting requirements was below ten percent).
179. One potential way to address this conflict is to require that the corporation include
an express statement of its corporate objective in the certificate of incorporation. See Justin
Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the Corporate
Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 204 (2015) (proposing an amendment to
corporate law statutes that require “for-profit corporations to include in their certificates of
incorporation an express statement of the objective(s) they will pursue”).
180. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations — A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 609 (2011) (noting the prevalence of the
profit-maximization mindset among corporate fiduciaries); see also Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 768 (2005)
(arguing that managers have the discretion—but not the legal duty—to sacrifice profit for
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A firm may also absorb an inefficient compliance position in order to
sustain the relationship with the regulator.181 Looking to build a long-term
partnership with an agency, the firm may be willing to absorb temporary
economic loss but only for a time. There will likely come a point,
however, when firm management will perceive the interaction with the
regulator as a form of advantage-taking and withdraw from a Collaborative
Regulation-based partnership. At that point, there is no additional surplus
to generate and no more information to share. The firm will not move
further along the curve toward TEa because it is no longer efficient to do so.
A regulator may not be satisfied with the firm’s preferred position in
the EIR model. This position may still allow for substantial risk of noncompliance and the attendant failure of the agency to achieve its regulatory
goals. If a regulator wants to move the firm past this efficient state,
whereby the firm will invest more in reducing non-compliance risk at a
disproportionally greater cost, the effectiveness of regulations based on
Collaborative Regulation diminishes. At this point, the shared surplus has
been distributed, and the regulator is asking the firm to engage in
inefficient behavior to achieve regulatory goals.
When this happens, Direct Regulation may take over. Direct
Regulation is coercive and punitive, enabling the regulator to exercise
influence by imposing standards that are backed by sanctions if they are not
followed.182
Regulatory authority based on command-and-control
principles can compel firms to engage in more risk reduction behavior that
is inefficient for them, but furthers the regulatory goals of the agency. This
action, however, erodes the possibility for future cooperation, as it denies
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social goals).
181. This behavior is analogous to that described in relational contracts, whereby
contracting firms pursue value generation over the entire relationship rather than each
transaction and also expect periodic deviations from value-maximizing behavior as a matter
of course. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 149, 153 (2005) (discussing how shared experiences and bonds strengthened
throughout a relationship results in “contracting [that] signifies a commitment to cooperate
in far more depth than a mere bargained for allocation of risk”); Richard E. Speidel, The
Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823, 828
(2000) (discussing how an extended duration of a relationship changes the business
interactions with regards to terms and discretion).
182. See Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633,
659–60 (2012) (pointing to an article defining the standard of Direct Regulation as “the
exercise of influence by imposing standards backed by . . . sanctions”); Blake C. Norvell,
Business Regulatory Lessons Learned From Amusement Park Safety Concerns: An
Integrated Approach to Business Regulation, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 267, 270
(2008) (“A government that utilizes command and control regulations sets mandatory
standards and penalizes those who do not comply. This method utilizes negative
reinforcement techniques, such as monetary fines for rule violations, as the primary
mechanism to encourage compliance.”).
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183. Cf. Park & Berger-Walliser, supra note 152, at 307–09 (describing adaptive
learning by firms of industry best practices and stakeholder impacts through legally
mediated communication with regulators and other firms).
184. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39
J. CORP. L. 769, 822–23 (2014) (discussing how incentive-based regulations may promote
incentives towards illegal behavior).
185. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires in part that any agency
promulgating a rule have to certify that the subsequent regulation will not impose significant
harm on a substantial number of small businesses. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (referencing
statutes analyzing and describing regulatory functions and procedures regarding small
businesses). Agencies that are unable to certify the absence of such significant harm must
then conduct a more thorough analysis of the rule’s impact and develop potential methods of
reducing the burden. See Robert C. Bird & Elizabeth Brown, Interactive Regulation, 13 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 837, 838 (2011) (discussing relationships established under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act between small business leaders and federal regulators that helped reduce
administrative burdens facing small businesses).
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the environment of trust and shared goals to emerge between firms and
regulators.183 Compliance programs based solely on Direct Regulation
often mimic extrinsic, incentive-based regulation, which may crowd out
ethical norms within the firm by putting a price tag on behaving
ethically.184
While awareness of the indirect costs of Direct Regulation is growing,
regulators are nonetheless statutorily mandated to ensure compliance. The
question remains, then: why do regulators not simply compel firms through
Direct Regulation to achieve maximum compliance? Regulators may
acknowledge the cost of regulation to businesses and may be statutorily
obligated to do so,185 but ultimately it is the policy objectives of the agency
that supersede the cost and profit goals of the firms that they regulate.
This question may be answered by referring to the EIR model. For
simplicity, assume that the regulator has no interest in firm costs, is
responsive to no legal requirement to concern itself with firm costs, and is
solely concerned with maximizing its regulatory objectives. In this
situation, the regulator’s ideal place for the firm is on the x-axis, which
represents full compliance with the stated regulation. The regulator is
indifferent to where the firm would be found on the x-axis, as the regulator
is indifferent to the cost the firm must bear to achieve this compliance goal.
More likely, under such conditions, the cost to the firm would be relatively
high, and thus it may be reasonably assumed that the single-minded
regulator would likely force firms toward TEa, where compliance is
complete (or near complete) but accomplished at a very high cost to the
firm.
The prevalence of laws based on Market Contingent Regulation
further complicates the regulator’s ability to compel compliance beyond the
firm’s compliance equilibrium. From the perspective of the regulator vis-à-
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vis a single regulated firm, Market Contingent Regulation introduces three
unpredictable variables: time, firm responses, and market effects. Because
Market Contingent Regulation, for the most part, relies on third party
market participants to take action (e.g., by responding to disclosed
information or exercising private rights of action), there is an inherent time
lag and uncertainty concerning how a regulated firm will respond.186
Further, in some cases, the responses of regulated firms to Market
Contingent Regulation may lead to unforeseen or undesirable effects on the
regulated activity until the regulator can modify its rules or policies.187
The regulator is meaningfully constrained from compelling full
compliance by multiple competing forces that impact regulator-firm
interactions. If Collaborative Regulation-based measures fail, regulators
can compel firms to reach a desired state of risk-cost compliance if they
have the appropriate legal mandate to exert Direct Regulation or change
their rules or practices regarding Market Contingent Regulation. However,
regulators do not operate in a vacuum and thus are subject to a variety of
competing push-and-pull forces, which are represented by the arrows in the
following figure:
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186. See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 145, at 66–68 (describing how the
effectiveness of mandatory disclosure rules depends on the value, compatibility, and
comprehensibility of users’ responses to disclosed information).
187. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 510–11 (2007) (examining the market costs of
mandatory disclosure rules).
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FIGURE 6. REGULATOR AND FIRM FORCES IMPACTING COMPLIANCE
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Figure 6 shows how these competing push-and-pull forces determine
where a firm falls within the continuum of compliance possibilities.
Regulators—including independent administrative agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other powerful
governmental regulators, such as the Federal Reserve—are constrained by
limited enforcement resources.188 Regulatory agencies often do not have
sufficient money or manpower to pull all firms towards TEa through
aggressive investigative and enforcement measures. Agencies must
accept—sometimes explicitly and other times only implicitly—an
imperfect “second best” for achieving policy goals and aim for some state
where systemic non-compliance occurs.189
Furthermore, regulatory agencies are also subjected to political
pressure. Firms lobby legislators through corporate political activity, and
legislators in turn respond to such lobbying by placing pressure on
administrative agencies to relax their enforcement of stated objectives.190
Legislators backed by political interests can compel agencies to relax their
enforcement goals even in the presence of an explicit statutory command to
push firms toward full compliance.191 This, in turn, places further
downward pressure on regulators to eschew compliance and allows
possible minor deviations from compliance to go unpunished. The agency
instead devotes its limited human and political capital to pursue narrower
strategic goals, such as investigating repeat violators or deterring certain
kinds of business conduct.192 This political reality places further pressure
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188. See Dylan Hanson, Increased Responsibility, Same (Inadequate) Funding for the
SEC,
CFTC,
COLUM.
BUS.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
(Mar.
6,
2011),
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11630 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/JQ2A-RKVG] (noting the
negative impact of Congressional underfunding on regulatory enforcement of the DoddFrank Act).
189. See Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Informed
Options Trading Prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading? 2, 35 (June 12, 2014),
www.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Informed-Options-Trading_June-1220141.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/786H-SLCR] (finding evidence of insider trading in
approximately one-quarter of corporate mergers and acquisitions in the sample while
identifying that the SEC litigated less than five percent of M&A transactions in the sample
studied).
190. See Yockey, supra note 55, at 337–38 (noting corporate lobbying to ease FCPA
enforcement practices and policies).
191. See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2044–49 (2014) (describing
how capture of federal financial regulators led to regulatory non-intervention and active
deregulation prior to the 2008 financial crisis).
192. See James Sterngold, Preet Bharara: Charging a Firm for Insider-Trading a ‘Rare
Use of Power’, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (July 17, 2013, 12:12 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/17/preet-bahrara-charging-a-firm-for-insider-
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on the agency to tolerate less than perfect compliance, signaling to firms
that somewhere further away from TEa is the expected state of compliance.
Thus, regulators’ preferred state of compliance for firms, taking into
account resource limitations and political realities, is somewhere between
TEa and TEi.193
V.

SURPASSING THE COMPLIANCE FRONTIER THROUGH RISKCOST TRANSFORMATION

Corporate compliance hinges on the relationship between regulators
and regulated firms. As shown by the EIR model, the mode of this
relationship is constantly subject to change, depending on the firm’s riskcost calculations and the regulator’s policy objectives and resource
constraints. There is another dimension to corporate compliance that the
EIR model sheds light on. The following discussion explores the ways in
which firms can improve the efficiency of their responses to regulatory
mandates without materially increasing the risk of non-compliance.
A. The Power of Risk-Cost Transformation
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trading-a-rare-use-of-power [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/LYS8-H4ZL] (quoting Preet Bharara, U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as saying that charging a company is a
“rare use of power” but one that can be used in some cases “particularly where you have
malfeasance over a long period of time”).
193. Note that, although we are using movement on the productivity frontier curve to
highlight these forces, it is not necessary for firms to reach technical efficiency (i.e., falling
on the curve by reaching the outer bounds of the compliance frontier) for this effect to
happen. Sub-efficient firms and sub-efficient regulators, can operate in a space above and to
the right of the curve in the same fashion without reaching the compliance frontier, and have
the same results.
194. See, e.g., Annual Report 2014, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 23–24 (2014),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/annual-report/2014/ar-downloads.htm
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5JJW-DWLP] (disclosing deployment of compliance-oriented resources
to comply with applicable financial regulations).
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Firms that find themselves on the compliance frontier have reached
technical efficiency within their particular risk-cost profile. Risk-averse
firms will be on a line closer to TEa while risk aggressive firms will fall
closer to TEb. Firms that have found both technical and allocative
efficiency will reach compliance equilibrium at TEi, AEi: the most efficient
point in the space of bounded compliance.
Firms in highly regulated industries have ramped up the hiring of
compliance officers and enhanced compliance-related information
technology.194 This “arms race” in compliance, however, has a finite
capacity to improve compliance outcomes. The firm’s allocation of
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resources to compliance is limited by its willingness and ability to divert
capital investments away from other corporate objectives.195 Due to the
resource constraints depicted in the EIR model, a firm must find ways to
increase its compliance capability (i.e., reduce the risk of non-compliance)
per unit of compliance-specific resources that it invests.196 In a regulatory
environment in which the absolute size of the largest firms, the complexity
of regulatory frameworks, and the opaqueness of firm decision-making all
continue to increase, a compliance program based on internal enforcement
of regulatory mandates is not adequate. Individual employees must have
the willingness and ability to self-impose constraints on illegal conduct, not
just respond to external sanctions.197 Just as how ethical decision-making is
a critical component of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the firm’s
commitment to social goals, ethical development is often necessary to
ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations.198
But what if the compliance frontier can be expanded? A firm may find
new ways to improve its compliance profile, which may open up a new
curve, and result in a new series of risk-cost combinations. Such
innovative firms push back the compliance frontier toward a new level of
innovation. This new and uncharted frontier can generate one of the most
sought after assets for an enterprise: a competitive advantage that is not
easily imitable by rivals.199 The expression of this new frontier in the EIR
model is evident in the following figure:

04/17/2017 09:23:23

C M
Y K

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 49 Side B

195. See SIFMA Compliance White Paper, supra note 31, at 22–24 (noting the very
high costs and limited resources available for designing and staffing compliance
surveillance).
196. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 585 (observing that firms prefer allocating capital to
strategically oriented projects vis-à-vis proposed regulatory investments driven by cost
reduction).
197. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference: Reforming Culture
and
Behavior
in
the
Financial
Services
Industry
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141020a.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/WL5Y-EJ6U] (discussing how compliance systems management and
regulators put in place to monitor and shape behavior is a work in progress).
198. See Leslie E. Sekerka, Compliance as a Subtle Precursor to Ethical Corrosion: A
Strength-based Approach as a Way Forward, 12 WYO. L. REV. 277, 278 (2012) (noting the
difficulty that employees face in acting ethically due to the complexity of the issues and the
pressure of short-term organizational goals such as profit).
199. See Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J.
MGMT. 99, 102 (1991) (defining competitive advantage as the implementation of a valuecreating strategy “not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential
competitors”); see generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING
AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985) (describing how firms create competitive
advantage).
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FIGURE 7. CREATING A NEW COMPLIANCE FRONTIER
THROUGH RISK-COST TRANSFORMATION
As shown in Figure 7, this “risk-cost transformation” approach
involves measures undertaken by the firm that shift its compliance curve
downward toward the productivity frontier, thus enabling it to comply with
regulation more efficiently. Reflecting this shift, the firm’s compliance
equilibrium moves down and to the left, reflecting a net improvement in its
technical efficiency per unit of investment in compliance.

Risk-cost transformation of the corporate compliance function is
accomplished through two distinct methods. Firms can seek to enhance the
capacity either of individual firm employees or firm management as a
whole to manage compliance. While the former focuses on improving
individual decision-making by employees within the firm, the latter focuses
on firm-wide internal governance. We briefly highlight the relevant
aspects of each of these compliance-enhancing methods by reference to the
EIR model.
To achieve risk-cost transformation by enhancing individual decisionmaking capacity, a widely recognized approach is to change the firm’s
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04/17/2017 09:23:23

C M
Y K

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 50 Side B

04/17/2017 09:23:23

2_BIRD_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

334

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/13/17 11:11 AM

[Vol. 19:2

corporate culture in order to make it more conducive to compliance.200
Lynn Sharp Paine’s formative research on organizational integrity focuses
on establishing legitimacy with employees through the development of
organizational values.201 A culture of integrity, when implemented in a
manner that calibrates the firm’s risk appetite with its institutional capacity,
not only motivates individual employees to act ethically, but just as
importantly, equips them with the analytical tools and mindset to identify
breaches of compliance.202 Firms in a range of industries have established
corporate integrity systems and, in many cases, have integrated them into
their compliance functions.203 In many cases, the attitude of managers,
corporate executives, and other firm leaders towards ethics has an outsize
impact on ethical behavior throughout the organization.204 A “tone at the
top” established by senior management and the board of directors is critical
to ensuring corporate integrity and deterring fraud.205
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200. Corporate culture may be defined as “the set of shared beliefs and norms [within
the corporation] that tells people how to act when there are no formal rules.” René M. Stulz,
Risk-Taking and Risk Management by Banks, 27 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2015).
201. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV.
106, 111 (1994). See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1791–95 (2007) (citing and
describing scholarly research and industry studies on the impact of integrity-based
programs).
202. See Bird & Park, supra note 51, at 234–38 (describing how a culture of integrity
promotes compliance); see also Thomas C. Baxter, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel,
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Compliance – Some Thoughts About Reaching the Next Level,
Remarks at the Fordham Journal of Corporate Counsel & Financial Law Symposium (Feb.
9, 2015), http://www.bis.org/review/r150210c.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/BF5X-MHBD] (citing
research finding that compliance programs integrating values-based ethics training are more
effective in promoting compliance).
203. See DeStefano, supra note 7, at 95–96 (noting how the compliance function has
evolved to integrate ethics training); SIFMA Compliance White Paper, supra note 31, at 27
(noting the split between firms with a combined ethics/compliance function versus firms
with separate ethics and compliance functions).
204. See Orly Lobel, Linking Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for
Designing Effective Reporting Systems, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 51 (2012) (noting studies
indicating that the attitude of managers plays a pivotal role in shaping the ethical conduct of
employees, such as reporting misconduct).
205. Bradley Lail et al., The Influence of Regulatory Approach on Tone at the Top, 126
J. BUS. ETHICS 25, 26 (2015) (defining tone at the top as “the standard set by the
organization’s leadership whereby performance is measured; the culture within which the
members of the organization operate; the tone set by senior management; irrespective of
management’s documented strategy and policies, it is the force that drives individual
professionals; the “unseen hand” that directs activities regardless of management’s
proximity to the action; and a commitment to the quality of care clients receive.”) (quoting
Tone at the Top and Audit Quality, INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS 8 (Dec. 2007),
http://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/tone-at-the-top-and-audit-q.pdf)
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9KWG-3C89])).
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Integrity-based approaches to compliance are not infallible, however.
Ethics programs integrated into the compliance function are often resourceintensive and require customized systems for firms in different industries,
legal jurisdictions, and cultural environments.206 The impact of integritybuilding can be difficult to measure207 and, according to some critics, do
not have a material impact on compliance.208 Furthermore, the payoff from
integrity-based approaches may not be uniform across the firm.
Another method of risk-cost transformation can be achieved through
enterprise risk management (ERM). ERM is a practice “designed to
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be
within its risk appetite, [and] to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of entity objectives.”209 This includes compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.210 ERM enables a firm to more effectively
identify and mitigate compliance risk in relation to other risks, rather than
in isolation.211 ERM views all sources and effects of risk as parts of an
integrated, strategic, and enterprise-wide system.212 In the aftermath of the
financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010, there is now far greater scrutiny on the relationship between
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206. See Managing Global Ethics and Compliance as an Asset, Not an Expense, WALL
ST. J. RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2014/12/04/managing-global-ethics-and-compliance-as-an-asset-not-anexpense [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/H8EQ-XETK] (noting the ethics and compliance challenges that
U.S. companies face when expanding into emerging markets).
207. See Stulz, supra note 200, at 16 (“There is little empirical work on the relation
between culture and corporate outcomes, in large part because of the difficulty of measuring
the dimensions of culture.”).
208. See Krawiec, supra note 52, at 510–15 (citing empirical studies on codes of ethics,
organizational compliance structures, and diversity training to argue that compliance
programs are ineffective as a means to reduce socially harmful conduct).
209. Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, COMM. OF SPONSORING
ORGS.
OF
THE
TREADWAY
COMM’N
2
(2004),
http://www.coso.org/
documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/736M-23C3].
210. Id. at 3.
211. See Martin F. Grace, J. Tyler Leverty, Richard D. Phillips & Prakash Shimpi, The
Value of Investing in Enterprise Risk Management, 82 J. RISK & INS. 289, 290 (2015)
(describing ERM as “a holistic approach to risk management . . . [where] a firm examines
risks jointly, assessing the interaction of each risk with the firm’s portfolio of other
important risks”). Firms face a multitude of risks, including financial risks (such as credit,
liquidity, and market risk), strategic risk, reputational risk, and various sources of
operational risks. MILLER, supra note 1, at 539–41. Compliance risk is often categorized as
a component of operational risk. See Risk Management Practices and Regulatory Capital –
Cross-Sectoral Comparison, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION 23 (Nov. 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/
VKB6-Q8BS] (noting that operational risks include legal and compliance-related risks).
212. Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 581 (2008).
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corporate governance, risk management, and compliance.213
ERM facilitates firm-wide regulatory compliance in two interrelated
ways. First, the integration of compliance with ERM enables a firm to
identify the range of risks across the firm resulting from inadequate
compliance. In many firms, the effectiveness of compliance is hindered by
a compliance function that segregates responsibility within the firm based
on the functions or units that are subject to regulation, the government
agency that has regulatory authority, or the country in which regulation is
being applied.214 Compliance risk may lead to damage to a firm’s brand or
a loss of customer confidence that has adverse financial, business, and
reputational impacts that go beyond the costs of regulatory enforcement
actions or civil suits.215 ERM-based compliance is particularly useful to
address multi-jurisdictional regulatory mandates and overlapping legal and
CSR obligations.216
Second, ERM-influenced compliance aims to improve effective
communication channels among different business units and between
business units and senior management and the board of directors.217 By
requiring unit-level managers within the firm to assess risk holistically and
report these assessments up the ladder, the firm’s decision-makers are able
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213. See Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise
Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 51 (2009) (noting that
“UBS revamped its risk management structure” and “increased the emphasis on risk
reporting” in response to the financial crisis); Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible
Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP L.
121, 123 (2011) (finding that large bank holding companies substantially modified their
corporate governance policies by augmenting board oversight of risk management in the
aftermath of the financial crisis); Paul Rose, Regulating Risk by “Strengthening Corporate
Governance,” 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (describing a link between risk management
and corporate governance and how these failures contributed to the financial crisis). See
also MILLER, supra note 1, at 1 (declaring governance, risk management, and compliance
“in vogue”).
214. See The Risk Intelligent Enterprise, DELOITTE supra note 56, at 8 (describing the
tendency of organizations to separate into “silos” based on geography or business function).
Silos can also occur within corporate departments as well as between them.
215. Compliance Risk Assessments, DELOITTE 4 (2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-compliance%20riskassessments02192015.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/9T7E-WJQ8].
216. Demystifying Sustainability Risk: Integrating the Triple Bottom Line Into an
Enterprise Risk Management Program, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY
COMM’N
5–6
(May
2013),
http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO-ERM%20
Demystifying%20Sustainability%20Risk_Full%20WEB.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2R5ULKYJ] (describing global environmental and non-financial reporting risks). See also Bird &
Park, supra note 51, at 230 (referring to ethical and social mandates whose legal status may
be uncertain or contested).
217. See Harner, supra note 92, at 1334 (noting the importance of effective
communication and the free flow of information regarding risk assessment).
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to identify firm-wide trends, patterns, and inconsistencies across the firm’s
various compliance-related activities.218 For purposes of analytical clarity,
the EIR model conceptualizes the response of a firm to a single regulatory
mandate. Of course, in reality, corporate compliance is multimodal: any
given firm must simultaneously manage compliance with a range of
distinct, but sometimes overlapping, regulatory requirements. Through an
enterprise-wide assessment of its responses to all regulatory mandates, a
firm can capture aggregate efficiency gains by identifying compliance
strategies that address multiple legal obligations or even strategic
opportunities outside of compliance.219
While potentially transformative, ERM is not a panacea for
compliance challenges. First and foremost, there is a danger in simply
equating compliance and risk management. While risk and compliance
functions are interrelated,220 they do not necessarily implicate the same
level of legal scrutiny.221 Contrary to binary conceptions of compliance,
the EIR model shows that firms can make tradeoffs between compliance
risk and other business investments. However, the nature and scope of
these tradeoffs are not as visible nor as value-enhancing as comparable
tradeoffs involving other forms of risk. Expected returns from greater risktaking are higher in respect of other types of risk.222 Firms that view noncompliance risk-taking as equivalent to compliance run the risk of
encumbering the ability of business units to take advantage of opportunities
to increase firm value by assuming greater risk.223 Further, subsuming the
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218. See Harner, supra note 213, at 55 (“Thinking about ERM solely as a monitoring
process undercuts its potential value. . . . But equally important is the information targeted
by the system and transmitted to the board.”).
219. See Malloy, supra note 26, at 603 (describing how compliance may be inhibited by
inconsistent incentives between operational managers and compliance officers and by
ineffective communication channels between them).
220. See Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations,
Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at NSCP National Meeting: The Role of Compliance and
Ethics
in
Risk
Management
(Oct.
17,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2011/spch101711cvd.htm [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/C9Z7-T4FL] (differentiating
compliance, ethics, and risk management).
221. See Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 100 (2010) (discussing the relationship between
oversight liability and risk management practices); Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to
Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153, 1158–1160 (2010) (criticizing the
application of Caremark oversight liability to risk management); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 97, at 984 (“Just as the business judgment rule insulates risk taking from judicial
review, so Caremark should insulate risk management from judicial review.”).
222. See Stulz, supra note 200, at 15.
223. Id. (describing the tradeoffs between risk management and expected return such as
when an inflexible risk management structure impedes firms’ abilities to take advantage of
business opportunities).

39057-ple_19-2 reissue Sheet No. 52 Side B

04/17/2017 09:23:23

2_BIRD_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

338

3/13/17 11:11 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19:2

compliance function into ERM—such as, for example, involving the Chief
Risk Officer in the reporting of compliance to the CEO or the board—may
lower the stature and perceived importance of compliance within the
firm.224
CONCLUSION
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Y K
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224. Michael A. Dawson, Integrating Compliance Risk Management into Enterprise
Risk Management, 21 BANK ACCOUNTING & FIN. 30, 33 (2008). See also Malloy, supra
note 26, at 580–82 (noting how capital allocation within firms is driven by the relative
influence of certain units and their perceived strategic importance).
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Compliance is an increasingly complex and diverse area of legal and
business activity. A growing array of regulatory mandates and modes of
regulatory enforcement and an increasing number of firms and jurisdictions
have spurred interest among legal scholars, practicing lawyers, and
compliance professionals alike. This Article seeks to distill the process of
compliance by focusing on the risk-cost tradeoffs that guide the
interactions of firms with regulators. The insights from the EIR model
shed new light on corporate governance debates in various areas of law.
By showing how different forms and approaches to regulation affect
compliance, our model suggests that the effectiveness of business
regulation as a form of social ordering heavily depends on how it shapes
firm-derived incentives.
This Article highlights the central role of regulators in helping firms
achieve risk-intelligent compliance that optimizes investments in
compliance made by both regulators and regulated firms. While business
regulation and the business of corporate compliance continue to grow, it is
unrealistic to assume that regulators have unlimited resources and dubious
to argue that regulators should have infinite power. Instead, in light of the
limited capacity of regulators to compel firms to maximize compliance
(i.e., occupy the upper left quadrant of the EIR model), regulators and
policymakers must find more innovative ways to achieve the public policy
goals of regulation. The EIR model suggests that regulators should be
more cognizant of the mix of Direct Regulation, Collaborative Regulation,
and Market Contingent Regulation that they use vis-à-vis any given firm or
industry. For certain regulations where the societal costs of firm noncompliance are relatively high, this observation may lend support for more
stringent regulation—either in the form of greater use of Direct Regulation
or increased incentives to third parties for Market Contingent Regulation—
in order to flatten the left tail of firms’ individual compliance curves and
thus decrease the ratio of compliance investment over non-compliance risk.
In many other cases, regulators and firms would benefit from collaboration
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to enable more self-aware compliance decisions by firms. Firms stand to
benefit from determining the shape of their compliance curves and the
location of their compliance equilibria. Regulators stand to benefit from
thinking about regulation in smarter, more subtle ways. The theoretical
insights of this Article provide a conceptual framework for improving firm
effectiveness and guiding regulatory reform.
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